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Thunderbird



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The Thunderbird



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COVER

MCpl J. Joyce hard at
work in Ancona.

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EDITOR IN CHIEF

Cdr P.H. Jenkins

MANAGING EDITOR

Maj M. Bellefleur

EDITOR

Capt P.A. Nicol

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The Thunderbird Journal, the official journal of the Security Branch, is published quarterly and is an authorized DND periodical in accordance with CFAO 57-14.

The aim of the Thunderbird Journal is to provide a focal point for Branch activities, to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas, and to foster professionalism and esprit de corps.

Items suitable for publication in the Thunderbird Journal will vary in terms of topics and format but can include both items of Branch wide interest as well as more informal reports of local events. Articles may be submitted direct or through the normal chain of command subject to the approval of appropriate commanders as applicable.

Letters to the Editor, questions or editorial comment will be welcome, however, the Editorial Board reserves the right to reject articles considered unsuitable for publication.

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Direct all correspondence to:

*Managing Editor
The Thunderbird Journal
NDHQ/DG SAMP
Mgen George R. Pearkes
Ottawa (Ont.)
K1A 0K2*



LETTER FROM THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

BY COMMANDER P.H. JENKINS

We live in interesting times! With all the recent developments in Canada, the Forces and the Security Branch, one wonders where it will all end. With the Force Reduction Plan about to be felt by the Branch for the first time, 1995 promises to be a challenge. At the same time, we look for signs of stability, and at the end of the day, the Branch represents one of the anchors we can hold onto during the storm.

The Thunderbird Journal also endures as one of the lasting symbols of our profession and is weathering the many changes, although not without some battering. A recent review of Canadian Forces publications examined our journal, along with many others, and concluded that it should be retained. It was deemed to be essential to the maintenance of professionalism and "esprit de corps" in the Branch. It is now up to us to ensure it fills this purpose.

The first thing we have had to deal with was a changing of the guard, and with the FRP and postings, it is anticipated that more changes will be necessary in the fall.



Your current and temporary editorial committee is:

Maj Max Bellefleur
– *Managing Editor*

Capt Pete Nicol
– *Editor*

Maj Vince Buonamici
– *Staff Member*

Capt Richard West
– *Staff Member*

As Editor-in-Chief, I appeal to all of you to continue your support for the Thunderbird Journal. We are looking for articles and photographs that deal with recent activities, as well as forward-looking ideas that reflect our professional development.

With the increasing involvement of Security Branch members in foreign operations, there is much interest in learning about their experiences. We also look to our retired members, including those about to take the leap, to contribute material from a different perspective. All of us pulling together, will ensure the Journal continues to be an important facet of the Branch.

SECURITAS!



NOTES FROM THE BRANCH ADVISOR

COL P.C. MACLAREN

The military culture has won itself a reputation as being an ultraconservative preserve where nothing changes except, perhaps, in response to battlefield disasters. We are clearly in the process of being shaken out of this comfortable but dangerous reliance on the old assumption that "the way we've always done it" is, *de facto*, the way it has to be done.

The catalyst here is, of course, the need to economize; a nuisance perhaps, but much to be preferred over the traditional battlefield massacre. One of the first symptoms of the coming days of change was the announcement that the Force Reduction Plan will be applied to the Security Branch. While we all, those who leave and those who stay, are watching this development somewhat nervously, it does appear to be a win-win situation. It is entirely voluntary and so will only cause those who were already planning to move on to accelerate their departures to a common date. They will be doing what they always planned to do but will be doing it with an economic boost in their pocket (and they will need it out there!). Those of us who plan to serve on may profit from a loophole in the pay freeze - promotions to replace our departing superiors.

Why should we be nervous? Well, there is always the fact that we know we will lose some of those who have daily helped to make our work more enjoyable and a source of pride. We may also fear that the offer will



clean out our best; that those who have the most get-up-and-go will get up and go. The personnel gurus in the career-shop assure us that this will not happen (they have gained previous experience with other classifications). They predict that those departing will come from an even slice down the merit list. Good and bad, we all reach the end of the road at about the same speed.

This leaves the last concern, that the offer will appeal to too many. This would be the lose-lose state; either the Branch is decimated

or applicants are refused (or a blend of both). Again, the breadth of the offers was calculated on the basis of some experience and is not expected to overshoot the target figures by too much. I must admit to having my fingers crossed.

The final product should be a refreshed Branch with improved opportunities for promotion and a new influx of recruits, increasing the number of women available for military police duty (a growing concern as our reliance on LOTP was inadvertently evolving us into a unisex trade) and a guarantee that years from now there will be no major gaps in the spectrum of trade experience reflecting the years in which recruiting was suspended.

But this is just the leading edge of the changes which we must expect. If this observation frightens you, you are only human. If you see it as bad news, you are a dinosaur. It heralds an environment which is going to make major demands on our professionalism, vision and innovativeness. It is also a golden opportunity.

Finally, in this my first contribution to "Notes from the Branch Advisor", let me confess that, in all the years I have known this publication, I have never survived this far in my reading of this particular column. As you are still with me, ought I to congratulate you on your devotion? . . . or your perversity?

BRIGADIER GENERAL YUILL, OMM, CD COLONEL COMMANDANT OF THE SECURITY BRANCH

By Col P.C. MacLaren, Director General Security and Military Police

We, in the Security Branch, have been extraordinarily fortunate with the quality of individual whom the Minister has appointed as our Colonel Commandant. The tradition was initiated in 1983 with the appointment of Vice Admiral J.A. Fulton, CMM, CD, and perpetuated in 1987 when Major General A. Pickering, CMM, CD, was named to the position. In each case the Branch received a true gentleman and leader of proven high calibre who quickly demonstrated that he understood and cared for the Branch. On 30 September 1994, we retained our perfect record with the appointment of Brigadier General W.A. Douglas Yuill, OMM, CD.

General Yuill served in the ranks as a Sapper in the Engineers. He saw duty in

Korea and was subsequently commissioned into the Canadian Guards in 1956. He has served in Germany and Cyprus, was the Director of Defence Intelligence, the Deputy Commander of the Special Force, the Chief of Staff Militia in Pacific Area, and the Deputy Force Commander of UNDOF in Damascus. In 1988 he retired from active service (but never from an active involvement with the Canadian Forces) after thirty eight years. It is not necessary for me to emphasize the depth and breadth of experience that he has acquired.

Since his appointment, I have had the pleasure of accompanying General Yuill to several Branch gatherings and have remained in continuous contact with him (usually at his initiative). In his communiqué in this issue, he notes he has many friends in the Branch. I have been astounded to the degree

to which this is true. He seems to know everybody! He also says that he hopes to meet as many of us as possible in the next twelve months. This is no idle statement. General Yuill delights in exchanging ideas with all ranks at any times and seems tireless in his willingness to be wherever he can meet and talk with military police. He understands us and shares our concerns. He also can bounce our ideas off of an understanding of the needs of "the commander", the history of similar "brilliant concepts" and the idiosyncrasies of "the hierarchy" and he can provide us with that elusive element, wisdom.

If you fail to meet the Colonel Commandant during the next year, it certainly won't be his fault. If you do take the opportunity to meet him, you will understand my enthusiasm over his appointment.



Thoughts from the Colonel Commandant

**BGEN W.A. DOUGLAS YUILL,
OMM, CD**

I wish to express, to all members of the Branch, my sincere appreciation for the honour you have accorded to me by selecting me as your Colonel Commandant. During my almost thirty-eight years of Regular Force service, I was fortunate to serve in many appointments which brought me in daily contact with Branch members and permitted me to appreciate the strong professionalism and dedication which has become a hallmark of the Branch. Thus, I am proud to have been asked to join the Military Police family, and will do all I can to merit this recognition and to support the Branch in every way possible. I hope to meet as many of you as possible in the next twelve months, both at your work place and socially.

These are now, and will continue to be, difficult times for the Branch and for the Canadian Forces. The ongoing program of closures of Canadian Bases and facilities, overseas and here in Canada, will further decrease the possibilities of serving in areas of our personal choosing, while the increase in United Nations and other multinational missions, causes stress because of more frequent and prolonged separations from family and friends. The implementation of the Force Reduction Plan for both Officers and NCMs will see a severe reduction in the level of experience within the Branch and the loss of many old friends who will avail themselves of these opportunities to begin a second career. The announcement in the White Paper of further reductions in the overall strength of the Canadian Forces over the next two years may force the introduction of a further FRP. The continued pressure on the


CF to adopt the many human and personal rights initiatives currently the vogue in Canadian Society will make it even more difficult for the Military Police to do their jobs. This is not a pleasant prospect – particularly for the newer members of the Branch, who can well be asking themselves if there is still a valid career opportunity in the Armed Forces. I think the answer to that question is YES!

Canada will continue to require significant Armed Forces to meet a variety of needs, both here at home and overseas, in support of our external treaties and obligations. Such Forces will have to include capable and dedicated Military Police, both for our home based units and for deployment forces. The FRP will avoid the prospect of a complete freeze on promotions, and there will still be a great variety of interesting and challenging locations and jobs in which to serve. The concept of serving our beloved country, Canada, in the uniform of her Armed Forces will continue to provide a strong sense of reward, just as it has been for thousands who have gone before us. There will continue to be a strong need for initiative, loyalty, dedication and professionalism to be exhibited, particularly by those sworn to uphold military rules and regulations and the civil and criminal laws of the land. In short, I believe that there will be



a rewarding career in uniform, in the service of our country, for those who choose it. I urge each and every one of you to continue your efforts to improve yourself, your unit, your formation, the Branch, and the CF, at every opportunity.

I shall look for ways in which I can support and assist you, as well as for opportunities to draw the attention of the remainder of the Forces and the general public to the very many positive activities which you undertake on a daily basis. You should be very proud of all your past achievements and should actively seek to continue to regularly add to the strong, positive reputation of the Military Police family.



Aircraft Security Officer Programme

By WO P.H. Simms

The Canadian Forces, by Memorandum of Understanding with the RCMP, is responsible for ensuring that CF aircraft transporting Code 1 VIPs are secure against acts of terrorism, sabotage, or criminal or malicious damage. Some Code 1 dignitaries include Her Majesty the Queen, the Governor General, the Prime Minister of Canada, visiting foreign heads of state, and other persons as may be designated from time to time by NDHQ.


Qualification of Aircraft Security Officers (ASOs) is strictly controlled by the Command Security and Military Police Officer at Air Command Headquarters. To achieve the qualification of an ASO, Security and Military Police personnel must pass a formal three week course conducted annually at 8 Wing Trenton. Upon successful completion of the formal course

and a check ride given by an experienced ASO, the new ASO will have received adequate training to fulfil the ASO mandate of any given task. To maintain certification, ASOs must pass a stringent weapons qualification course designed especially for the ASO programme, every quarter.

ASOs have been involved in numerous taskings and have had the opportunity to personally meet with dignitaries being transported as well as VIPs in their homeland, such as the President of Russia. The CF not only transports dignitaries from Canada to another country but also transports foreign dignitaries to and within Canada. For example, during EXPO 1967 in Montreal, the CF transported Her Majesty the Queen and other visiting heads of state to Canada.

While transporting dignitaries to another country, the ASO's duties are normally rested once the aircraft

lands, as security of the aircraft is the responsibility of the host nation. However, the ASO is responsible for periodic checks to ensure that security of the aircraft is maintained and not compromised. However, this does not always work by the book. In February 1973, Sgt (now retired) Jack Welch completed his ASO course and check ride. While on his check ride in March of that year, he accompanied two other ASOs on a CF Boeing 707 to Vietnam during a visit by the Honourable Mitchell Sharpe, who was visiting Canadian troops employed in South Vietnam as part of the multi-national peacekeeping force. In addition to providing security while aboard the aircraft, the ASOs, with the assistance of other Military Police who accompanied the flight, provided ground security throughout the visit. In this situation, the ongoing war between North and South Vietnam and ongoing security threat, dictated that Canadian Military Police maintain security on a 24/7 basis.




Sgt E. Dawson and Sgt G. Menard in Ancona.



In March 1993, the Canadian Airlift Control Element (ALCE) in Zagreb supporting the humanitarian relief flights into Sarajevo (Operation Airbridge) moved to the Adriatic Coastal city of Ancona, Italy. There the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) oversees the humanitarian aid and relief supply flights conducted by Canada, Germany, United Kingdom, Norway and United States. At the time of the move from Zagreb in Italy, the ALCE Commander identified a need to the Commander of Air Transport Group for ASOs to accompany all CF flights into the former Yugoslavia. The ASOs were required to provide security response because of an identified threat to the aircraft by some passengers using the flights into and out of Yugoslavia. At Ancona, each Canadian air crew now has an ASO attached for this purpose.

Thus, the duties of the ASO on Op Airbridge are greatly expanded on those taught during the ASO course in Trenton. The daily routine begins at 0545 hours when the crew departs the hotel in Senigalia for the airport. Upon arrival, the ASO will assist the Loadmasters in ensuring passenger and load manifests are properly prepared while the rest of the crew carry out their own pre-flight procedures. The ASO is responsible for physically searching each passenger and his/her baggage. Personal baggage is restricted to 20 kilograms and there is also a restriction on items such as alcohol, tobacco and coffee due to Black Market activity in Sarajevo. For instance, a quarter kilogram of coffee will sell for \$25 (US). Since the Loadmasters are involved in other aircraft duties when airborne, the ASO is responsible for ensuring that passengers are properly seated and wear the flak vests during the "combat entry" to Sarajevo airport. (Combat entry is a term used to describe the




Sgt G. Menard – Op Airbridge ASO duties.

approach and departure profiles the aircraft uses while operating in a hostile territory.) At times, passengers from Sarajevo may include Serbs, Croats and Muslims, who are at war with each other, and as such, the ASO must maintain strict control over the passengers during the flight.

When landing in Sarajevo, the ASO is normally the first to deplane. He/she will provide the load and passenger manifests to the contingent air movements personnel. Once it is determined that the area is safe, the passengers may then deplane. Once the plane has been unloaded, the ASO will assist passengers boarding the aircraft for the return trip to Italy. Because of the hostile environment at the airport, one of the aircraft's engines is always left running and the CC130 Hercules is always ready to make a quick getaway. Despite the short time to prepare, the ASO must ensure that those passengers entering the aircraft are in fact those listed on the mani-

fest and that their baggage have been searched. The ASO will also assist in securing personal baggage with the Loadmasters. Upon arrival in Ancona, the ASO will escort the passengers to the civilian airport terminal where the local police and customs personnel are notified and carry out the required clearances.

The Aircraft Security Officer programme has evolved over the years from a strictly VIP transport security role to a role that involves deployments with Airforce assets in a Tactical Airlift (TAL) mission. Currently there are two ASO and two MP ground security personnel attached to the ALCE in Ancona in support of Op Airbridge. At the time of writing this article, ATG had just wrapped up another deployed humanitarian TAL mission in Rwanda, Africa. During that six month operation, known as Operation Scotch, as many as 15 ASOs participated from all across Air Command.



The Credibility of The Security and Military Police (SAMP) Branch: The Challenges of a Changing World

by Maj Tony Battista

An essay submitted as partial requirement for the Security Officer Advanced Course (SOAC) Canadian Forces School of Intelligence and Security Canadian Forces Base Borden

19 Nov 93

PREFACE

In preparation for this essay, I interviewed a number of Branch personnel regarding the credibility and viability of the Security and Military Police functions in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. Although this short essay does not allow for more elaborate treatment of the vast amount of information collected through these interviews, I have incorporated many of their ideas herein. I have benefited immensely from their comments, ideas, advice and concerns as well as those of my fellow Course Officers and Directing Staff of the Security Officer Advanced Course (SOAC). I am most grateful for their input.

Although the ideas presented in this paper have been influenced by many people and sources, it remains that all errors and omissions are solely my responsibility. Moreover, the views expressed are mine and do not necessarily represent those of the Security and Military Police Branch or those of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces.

"There is nothing more powerful than an idea whose time has come."
- Unknown

Introduction

This essay examines the credibility and viability challenges facing the Security and Military Police (SAMP) Branch.¹ Although not a panacea, the paper also outlines some initiatives which will undoubtedly generate debate and in the process, it is hoped, will help pave the future for the Branch.

These initiatives may appear inconsequential to some, unrealistic and somewhat grandiose to others, and perhaps too critical to those who hold the issues dear at heart. However, in most successful organizations rigorous analysis and criticism, if properly nurtured, can bring about healthy dividends. This is especially true when innovative ideas are strongly encouraged, properly channelled, and sought at all levels. Introspection, narrow vision and unnecessary detail, on the other hand, can crowd one's thinking, creating a sense of helplessness and chaos. Moreover, a dearth of published ideas inhibits further informed debate on many important issues. Therefore, this tract purposely focuses on a conceptual framework from which further study and substance can be generated while avoiding detailed recipes.


Some Perceptions of SAMP Functions

Born of obvious wartime necessity, the SAMP functions in the Canadian Forces have evolved over several decades into a myriad of peacetime and wartime activities, together with a rather complex yet versatile organization.² In fact, these activities

have grown and diversified to such an extent that today and in the foreseeable future it is difficult to imagine eliminating the security and military police functions altogether. Paradoxically, we are presently confronted with a rapidly changing environment which makes it difficult to justify these activities or programs to continue evolving in an ad hoc fashion without rigorous analysis as to their priorities and necessity in the wider context of Canadian Defence Policy. I would argue that the time is ripe to take stock, to consolidate, and to prioritize these activities and to assess their viability.

The Security and Military Police organization enjoys a long-standing tradition of professional services. Unfortunately, it is also faced with three undeserving labels: one of convenience; one of hindrance; the other of redundancy. Firstly, security is sometimes called upon to justify some hidden agenda or unrelated objective. How often have we witnessed the justification for a particular expenditure because it 'must satisfy security requirements'? When in fact, the hidden reason might have been because an organization or individual really wanted something else (for example, better office space, a new computer, new facilities, etc.) How often have organizations or individuals attempted to use the Military Police more for convenience than for impartiality?

Secondly, security is often viewed as hindrance to operations or other programs. The notion that 'security folks should be kept at arms length because they will only slow down progress' is all too prevalent in some quarters of the Department of National Defence (DND). Perhaps, the



recent debate on ADP security requirements is among the best example.

Thirdly, military police presence, although often appreciated, also raises the question of affordability and whether someone else can do it cheaper or better. I would suggest that this view is gaining momentum in these times of fiscal restraint, waste reduction and Force downsizing, especially with those who are concerned with the erosion of traditional combat capability. The cost of security and military police services, like the security costs in all major Crown projects will be undergoing rigorous scrutiny in the future.

All three labels present substantial credibility challenges, compelling leaders at all levels to rethink and re-assess the merits and viability of the security and military police functions. To be sure, SAMP organizations will inevitably

continue to attract some undeserved criticism from many quarters because of

the nature of their work. However, if the SAMP Branch is to survive and remain credible it must be for more fundamental reasons than the three labels mentioned here. This is particularly pressing in today's changing global environment, an appreciation of which is essential to set the stage for further discussion and analysis.


SAMP Functions in a Changing Global Environment


Although we continue to live in a very unstable and dangerous world, it is rather evident that the policies and tools which served their purposes in a Cold War scenario have outlived their usefulness. We no longer focus our energies and posture our defence capabilities to wage war against an ominous communist empire. Quite the contrary, the states of war and peace have become rather blurred and we are more realistically dealing with lower scale conflict which call upon military forces to participate in its resolution through peacekeeping (a term which might encompass peacemaking, peace restoration, and peace enforcement). Coupled with this is the realization that we are confronted with a climate of increasingly constrained resources, making it an obvious requirement to rationalize and manage what most of us think of as "our relative

levels of insufficiency"³ with genuine concern for fiscal prudence.

This means that what might have been acceptable and justifiable under past circumstances and to meet local needs must now stand the test of what is best and most economical for DND/CF as a whole. Thus, we are faced with the unenviable challenge of critically questioning what we do, how we do it, and how it all relates to the greater interest and direction of DND/CF. Today, it is simply not good enough to justify anything on the premise that 'it was always done this way.' What might have been an institutionalized premise in the past must now be systematically questioned, allowing for shifting paradigms. And herein lies the leadership challenge...to endorse the concept fully and to convey its meaning to subordinates by arduous example.

There simply are no sacred cows in these changing times, perhaps with one exception the wartime imperative. The fundamental existence for SAMP functions is the ability to support operations in wartime. As such, it is essential that the Branch remain acutely aware of how the CF is mandated and structured to conduct wartime operations. In this regard, the Branch must develop and sustain the ability to understand the formulation of Defence Policy as a whole together with the ensuing CF roles and missions, as well as realistic and credible SAMP support functions. For instance, the focus and structure of the CF has significantly shifted away from preparing for a highly mobile, mechanized war in central Europe to planning for and conducting peacekeeping and small scale peacemaking operations anywhere in the world, usually under the auspices of the United Nations. This important (and somewhat predictable) shift has meant that we can no longer prepare for a possible conflict against a specific enemy, nor can we envisage participating in such a conflict alongside known allies. In essence, peacekeeping calls for the development of new and unique capabilities and expertise.





Although one can appreciate the strong historical ties that our Branch has developed and maintained with the Royal Military Police, the time has come to look beyond our almost exclusive affiliation with Chichester (and of late with the USAF Security police).

Arguably, peacekeeping missions require CF personnel to receive as much para-police and civil-military relations training as they need conventional military skills and craft. For the SAMP Branch this may translate into a requirement to train with non-NATO States so as to widen our understanding of other countries and their inherent security and military police organizations.

Although one can appreciate the strong historical ties that our Branch has developed and maintained with the Royal Military Police, the time has come to look beyond our almost exclusive affiliation with Chichester (and of late with the USAF Security police). Training and exchange programs with other States would allow SAMP personnel to gain a wider understanding of the world we live in, to be better prepared for a range of eventualities which might call on their expertise, and be more credible in the eyes of external organizations.

The renewed CF focus on peacekeeping might also mean that SAMP personnel will be called upon to be part of special task forces dispatched to keep or restore peace in various troubled areas of the world. In situations where time does not allow for further training, the planners of peacekeeping missions will, in all likelihood, call upon SAMP resources (justifiably, even more so than the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)) to become an integral component of these task forces.

Time permitting, SAMP organizations, such as the Canadian Forces School of Intelligence and Security

(CFSIS), should also examine the feasibility of offering para-police training (as well as Intelligence training) to selected CF personnel who might be called upon to participate in international peacekeeping missions in areas of the world where liaison with local police authorities is necessary. This training is essential when CF personnel are called upon to help restore police and other civilian structures in foreign countries. This type of initiative might be highly suitable and desirable for SAMP personnel, for it would accomplish the two-fold purpose of honing their peacekeeping skills and of bringing the SAMP Branch closer to the 'operators.'

In a small but profound way, the Branch would partake in a process which might contribute to the eventual development of a 'Canadian Centre of Excellence for Peacekeeping'. There appears to be support that this type of training is both needed and desired, thus presenting a potentially challenging opportunity for the SAMP Branch. Undeniably, SAMP personnel are uniquely suited to conduct such training.

SAMP Functions in a Changing Domestic Environment


The environment within which the Canadian Defence Policy is formulated is changing in many other ways as well. Threats other than of a military nature in Canada are compelling our Armed Forces to play a much greater role at home than ever before.⁴ Military assistance to civil authorities, search and rescue, the drug trade, oil spills, other acts of pollution (accidental or deliberate),

potential terrorist acts, illicit exploitation of our natural resources, security and protection from internal dissidents, radicals and criminal elements; in each of these cases the support provided by our peacetime armed forces is liable to assume much greater importance.

Evidently, a high percentage of SAMP resources are engaged in peacetime roles and tasks which are also rapidly changing. This should not alarm those of us who believe that our sole 'raison d'être' is to prepare for war. After all, there is much to be said about the notion that being concerned with peace is as important (perhaps even more important) than being concerned with war. As such, might it be appropriate to channel some Branch thinking and energy into how SAMP personnel can better interact with other elements of DND/CF as well as with other government agencies, and be more useful in these areas? (An RCMP inspector to join SOAC or a provincial/RCMP investigator to join the criminal investigation course, for instance).

For instance, should greater emphasis be placed on how the Base Auxiliary Security Force (BASF) concept is integrated with SAMP resources in providing adequate security measures to DND/CF and other federal government facilities in Canada? Has there been any coordination with the various Land Forces Areas Headquarters regarding the initial deployment of BASF/SAMP resources and the subsequent deployment of combat forces for Internal Security operations? Who are the key players in terrorist or hostage taking incidents in Canada and how should local SAMP organizations prepare to support these players?

Has there been a careful and thoughtful review and analysis of SAMP participation in the Oka crisis? Although there have been a number of articles published in military and other learned journals about CF participation at Oka, has there been one on SAMP involvement (even if only in generic terms to



protect what might be considered of national security interest)? Have there been position papers on SAMP participation with the RCMP on fighting the illicit drug trade? Have SAMP personnel explored the opportunities and consequences that the Federal Law Enforcement Under Review (FLEUR) task force might have on the SAMP Branch?

Such absence or dearth of openly available information and ideas in all likelihood inhibits the SAMP Branch from influencing the process and the eventual outcome. While remaining sensitive to national security requirements, there are good reasons for SAMP personnel to write and publish their ideas and accomplishments. Much can be learned from the sharing of these ideas and experiences.

SAMP Functions and Fiscal Realities

Coupled with the drastically altered international scene and domestic situation, budgetary constraints, to which I briefly alluded to earlier, provide a compelling impetus to re-examine in sweeping fashion most activities involving SAMP resources. To be sure, this is so self-evident today that if it is not done from within the Branch it will simply be done by others and the Branch may be faced with a 'fait accompli'. This means that SAMP personnel cannot continue applying more resources to all problems. Nor can SAMP organizations 'do more with less' because if they continue stretching their resources too thin, they run the inevitable risk of being discredited for not doing all things well. The obvious alternative compels the SAMP Branch to work smarter and to prioritize in a rigorous and systematic fashion its activities, and discard those whose end-result is appreciably unimportant or too costly to achieve. Concurrently, those SAMP functions which must be done are to be cost effective and accomplished professionally and efficiently. This could also mean that we ask other organizations to

merge with us (such as CELE and INT) so as to "share" certain functions.

Obviously, the rationalization of SAMP functions cannot be conducted in a vacuum. In most cases, the participation and support of key components of DND/CF as well as the approval of its senior leadership are essential. The active participation of SAMP advisors at Command and Base level and their principal Commanders is crucial to the process in order to achieve greater understanding, consensus and support. This process will, in all likelihood, reveal that some activities for example, menial police investigations and reports, physical security checks which could be better done with greater use of electronic/technical devices, some aspects of the Security Clearance Program, the employment of contracted security personnel without careful rationalization and a cost-benefit analysis, comprehensive physical security surveys (even in a low risk environment) sap plenty of SAMP resources while the measurable end-results are negligible or not well appreciated.

This is particularly true when security policies and directives are interpreted and applied too rigidly, not allowing for a certain degree of risk management, or when readily available new technology is not exploited, such as smart card systems to control and monitor access.⁵ As such, some activities should be dropped altogether, some must be accomplished in a more cost-effective manner, and others might best be conducted by some other means/organization.

More Credible SAMP Initiatives

As we forge ahead with a thorough review of Branch structures and activities, the SAMP leadership should focus on some key initiatives which would, in my view, yield substantial dividends, generating greater SAMP Branch credibility both within DND/CF as well as with other government agencies.⁶

There is no doubt that a high priority within the upper circles of the Branch is to be able to understand and interpret Defence Policy and how SAMP resources can best be used to support CF roles. In this area, the Division of the Director General of Security and Military Police (DG SAMP), as the principal stakeholder, has the pivotal role of influencing where and how SAMP resources should be used.⁷ The efforts which are presently being made in this regard should be sustained in order to provide senior management the best possible opportunity to be convinced that SAMP resources are both viable and credible, and should continue to be called upon to serve the wider interests of DND/CF.

As a logical follow on, the SAMP Branch should place more emphasis on developing credible policy formulation expertise focusing on how SAMP resources can best serve the greater interests of DND/CF. This may be actuated in a number of ways, perhaps the most notable

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being: Branch sponsorship of post-graduate education, aggressively seeking employment in key out-of-Branch positions which are open to any occupation (including the ADM (Pol & Comm) Group where the Branch has not had a member in the past, and possibly with the United Nations policy and planning organisms),⁸ and concentrating efforts in research and development (R&D) both at the policy and technical levels. The development of this expertise is essential to any organization, especially one which is strongly influenced by both internal and external factors.⁹

It may be argued that this type of expertise could best reside in such organization as the Directorate of Police and Security Plans and Requirements (DPSPR), although it might be more accurate to replace the term 'Plans' with 'Policy'. Sponsoring post-graduate training would allow DG SAMP (through DPSPR) the added capability to rely, on a continuous basis, on a Branch member who would be able to focus on a series of Branch related matters as part of his/her Masters thesis.¹⁰ This independent and timely study could then be exploited further by DPSPR and other Branch organization. The staffing of a well educated civilian member within DPSPR might help provide continuity and change in the policy area.

Additionally, this has the potential of developing a body of knowledge as well as the necessary literature from which further innovative ideas could flourish and practical projects implemented. Simultaneously, this process would encourage Branch members to write and publish their ideas and concepts in a variety of Defence and Branch journals, thus creating a forum for advanced professional development. Ultimately, this would allow for greater expression of ideas, better applications of SAMP resources, and help the SAMP Branch generate greater understanding and support from other organizations. Much can be said about the Branch sponsoring further in-depth study of such thorny

issues as: whether Intelligence, Security, and Police functions should be re-amalgamated, whether further specialization of Security and Police is required, or whether regionalization of the SAMP Branch and its services should be pursued.¹¹ Moreover, a more technically focused group of officers and non-commissioned members (NCMs), possibly within DPSPR or the other directorates, could translate initiatives into specific plans and activities which could be actuated by Command and local SAMP organizations.

Formulating logical, powerful ideas and expressing them to the wider world around us is a key vehicle in creating opportunities and credibility. Unfortunately, opportunities are often lost if great ideas are kept in a bottle, or if they are allowed to be embraced by others who quickly seize the initiative and exploit them for their selfish benefit. There are plenty of excellent ideas floating around among SAMP personnel. The key rests with creating the necessary forum and atmosphere to channel these ideas in the right direction and for the greater benefit of DND/CF.¹²


In addition to providing timely and invaluable policy options to the DG SAMP and a focal point for broader professional development, a central policy body within the Branch could also contribute in informing other DND/CF elements of how the various SAMP organizations function, together with the multitude of services that they can provide. For instance, it seems to me that there has been so much mystique and secrecy about the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) in the past that key members of DND/CF are not familiar with its roles, responsibilities and capabilities.¹³ I suspect that a great number of officers and NCMs within the SAMP Branch are not quite clear as to the working relationships amongst the SIU, the Directorate of Security Operations (D Secur Ops), the Directorate of Police Operations (D Police Ops) and the Directorate of Security Clearances (DSC), their

roles, their responsibilities, and how they interact with other government agencies (Communication Security Establishment, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service and RCMP, for instance).¹⁴ I also suspect that a far greater lack of understanding exists outside the Branch in this regard.

As such, there is much to be gained by a proactive, knowledgeable and credible effort to inform and educate DND/CF personnel and organizations (and to be sure, not to exclude the Division of the Director General of Public Affairs (DGPA)) about SAMP structures and services.¹⁵ For example, how much is really known about the SAMP Branch expertise in the field of Information Technology Security (IT Sec) outside of a small group of Branch members at NDHQ? What has been published in this field in an open forum?

I would submit that a well prepared and articulated Communication Strategy for the Branch would generate a more sympathetic understanding for what SAMP resources can contribute to the greater cause and, in the process, 'credit would be given where credit is due.' Such endeavours would also allow the Director General and other senior Branch officers an opportunity to receive feedback from outside the Division and the Branch feedback which could help improve the organization and its services as part of the Defence 2000 initiative. This mechanism would allow for a continuous review process to ensure that Branch initiatives and activities are reconciled with changing DND/CF priorities.

Again, this would not be conducted in a vacuum. Involvement and understanding of outside organizations are critically important. From a professional development perspective, individual Branch members should be encouraged to participate in and attend the Annual Conference of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) which brings together an impressive



number of experts to focus on a variety of intelligence, security and security-related matters affecting Canada. CASIS is a non-partisan, independent think-tank and all of its position papers (roughly 8 to 12 annual papers) are available for public consumption.¹⁶ Similar encouragement should be made for Branch members to join such valuable organizations as the Federal Association of Security Officers (FASO), the various Police and Law Enforcement Associations, and the growing number of IT Sec associations and organizations.

In the area of interdepartmental cooperation, the FLEUR task force initiative should be seen as a possible cornerstone for the Branch's future involvement in the wider law enforcement community. The weight of influence is an important factor here because the final outcome of FLEUR will, in all likelihood, provide key legislation affecting all federal law enforcement organisms and how they must work together and cooperate. The current review of The Security Policy for the Government of Canada – 1991 will also entail major changes in security orders and regulations for DND/CF. This will have a significant impact on SAMP resources and functions. The SAMP Division, on behalf of DND/CF, is an obvious stakeholder in both of these endeavours and their eventual outcome. Therefore, involvement in these areas is crucial if SAMP resources are to be reviewed in a larger, systematic context.

The entrenchment of individual rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the resulting changes in social legislation have increasingly challenged some of the traditional norms and values associated with the Canadian Forces. The recent events in Somalia and others in Canada are leading to even greater challenges of the National Defence Act, the Code of Service Discipline, the Military Judicial System and the way the CF enforces service discipline. The DND/CF are faced with complex issues and problems which

will, most likely, bring about radical changes in the manner in which laws are enforced and discipline is maintained.

The SAMP Branch has a good deal to offer in this area and should be actively participating in the formulation of logical options to senior departmental managers and CF leaders. These options range from relegating all police functions relating to DND/CF to the local civilian police forces or the RCMP, to exercising more latitude with the powers of Peace Officers for the Military Police, to having all indictable offences dealt with in civilian court. Again, the SAMP Branch could make important contributions in this area. The current research being conducted and the policy options being formulated in the D Police Ops provide for much needed changes in the management of police investigations, police information management (Crown, Cos and media briefs), jurisdiction review and the conceptual evolution of a National Police Service (NPS). These initiatives will allow the Branch to influence changes, gain credibility and provide better training and direction to SAMP personnel throughout DND/CF.

Although the treasury of ideas does not stop here, the limitations of space and time allow me to present one last initiative in the conceptual framework which this essay has endeavoured to depict. This final point focuses on historical pride and Branch traditions. New ideas and change inevitably bring about apprehension and concern on the part of those who fear that revolutionary ideas might endanger morale, pride and Branch traditions. To be sure, these members (both officers and NCMs) are highly competent and have devoted a great deal of effort to their profession. Their concerns are genuine and must be heard.

Wisdom and prudence dictate that continuity and change must occur in harmony, without sweeping aside a proud history and traditions. After all, the military as a whole

cannot survive without customs and traditions. Nonetheless, the winds of change are upon us and certain trade-offs must be made. Therefore, the time is most opportune for the SAMP leadership to lobby someone with the interest and skills to write an official history of the various Security and Military Police organizations, functions and activities which have evolved from the early days of the Provost Corps. Such a challenging endeavour would contribute significantly to the evolutionary process and to the professional development of Branch personnel.¹⁷

Concluding Remarks

In brief, this essay has examined the credibility and viability challenges facing the Security and Military Police Branch. The leaders and managers of the Branch are faced with complex issues and questions. These challenges have been spurred by rapidly changing global and domestic events which are precipitating a complete re-thinking of Canadian Defence Policy, by fundamental changes brought about by new social legislation, and by a sober realization of Canadian fiscal restraints.

These challenges, however, should not necessarily lead to apathy and despair. Through a series of thoughtful initiatives the SAMP Branch can bring to bear much needed change, allowing for more credible support of DND/CF objectives, greater external understanding of SAMP capabilities and greater professional development of SAMP personnel.

ENDNOTES


1. Throughout the essay I have deliberately chosen to use the term Security And Military Police (SAMP) in a consistent manner. Thus, the essay refers to SAMP resources, the SAMP Branch and the Division of DG SAMP, knowing full well that the terminology still in use is MP resources, the Security Branch and DG Secur. In the case of SAMP resources, it is a generic term encompassing material, financial, information and personnel assets (although people should be viewed as the 'glue' that puts the other three together). When I refer to the SAMP Branch I am using the term to mean all officers and NCMs of the Sec81 and MP811 Military Occupations as well as civilian members employed within the various SAMP organizations. Although there is no place here to get into a philosophical



- discussion as to whether there should be a 'Branch' or not, the point remains that the vast majority of officers, NCMs and civilian members employed within SAMP organizations feel that the term 'Branch' gives them a sense of unity, pride and commonality. The intent is not to engage in a controversy on terminology or semantics but clearly to be consistent. The term SAMP more accurately reflects the duality of the occupation and the fact that both functions (security and police) are at present part of the same military occupation. Consistency in terminology is perhaps desirable because from an outside of Branch point of view there might still be some confusion in trying to come to grips with such terms as Provost, Provost Marshal, security police, shore patrol, military police, security officer, and SIU investigator. Incidentally, the term SAMP is being used more frequently since it first appeared in the late 1980s. Officially, the term was formally adopted by the NDHQ Administrative Unit/SAMP Section in August 1992 and shortly thereafter, Air Command formally adopted the same terminology (although informally the SAMP term had been in use for some time).
2. Canada, Department of National Defence, A Resource Management Guide for Security and Military Police, October 1993 (DRAFT) (Ottawa: NDHQ/DPSPR, 1993), Chapter 1, p.1/24. This reference lists 15 SAMP programs currently in place in DND/CF as follows: crime prevention, traffic control, drug enforcement, criminal investigations, community relations, law enforcement, criminal intelligence, detention and service prison, court and judicial, information security, physical security, personnel protection (ASO, CPP and VIP Security), security investigations, personnel security and ADP security. This Guide does not mention counter intelligence, threat and risk assessments, and liaison. There is no differentiation between wartime programs (for instance; refugees, stragglers, POW control, airfield protection, BASF deployment) and peacetime programs. It provides no indication of program priorities or Branch capability to achieve the aims of these programs. For instance, with the creation and rapid growth of Family Resource Centres, have SAMP organizations looked at re-directing resources to these Centres as part of the community relations program? Incidentally, these Centres have gained so much importance because they apparently cater to needs associated with: CF personnel deployed on peacekeeping duties; and drastic changes in social legislation.
 3. LGen P.J. O'Donnell, NDHQ Management Memorandum 7603-1 (VCDS), (Ottawa: NDHQ/VCDS, 21 October 1993), p.1. Although the present management philosophy within DND/CF appears to be one of decentralized responsibility, lower levels of management and leadership must ensure that whatever local initiative is taken takes into account fiscal realities and the overall goals of DND/CF.
 4. Canada, Department of National Defence, Statement by the Honourable Marcel Masse, September 17, 1991 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1991), p.4. It is too early to predict what the new Liberal Government which was sworn into office on 4 November 1993 will conclude with its review of Defence Policy, but it is difficult to imagine that it would not focus on increased domestic roles for DND/CF.
 5. Throughout government, there is now a shift of culture being promoted from 'zero risk' to 'risk management' mentality as part of Total Quality Management initiatives. As such, I suspect that senior management views both The Security Policy for the Government of Canada - 1991 (which is presently being re-written in its entirety) and Security Orders for DND/CF as attempting to achieve 'zero risk' at high cost. One such example is the requirement for 'Accreditation' of ADP equipment/systems processing unclassified/undesignated information. For further discussion on 'risk management' see Robert Fowler's "Report to the Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet", 4 August 1993 (Ottawa: NDHQ/DM, 1993).
 6. Although most of these initiatives focus on the Officer Corps of the SAMP Branch, they have significant importance for the NCMs as well.
 7. The 'DG SAMP anomaly' of being the only Division at NDHQ without a general rank officer does not help matters in this regard; however, tremendous progress is being made at present anomaly notwithstanding. Efforts to convince the senior leadership at NDHQ that a general rank SAMP officer is in the best interest of DND/CF should continue (even though this is unlikely to succeed in these times of fiscal restraint and downsizing).
 8. The recent initiative to have a SAMP Branch LCol posted to Forces Development Defence 2000 is a very positive step in this regard.
 9. In spite of the fact that the SAMP Branch is relatively small in comparison to others, the fact remains that SAMP resources are employed in a variety of activities from Coast to Coast and abroad. Moreover, as Specially Appointed Personnel with Peace Officer status, SAMP responsibilities are widely affected by Statutes which may be outside the realm of DND/CF.
 10. The Strategic and Conflict Studies programs now offered at several Canadian Universities and jointly sponsored by DND and the Department of Foreign Affairs (formerly External Affairs), are an excellent venue for post-graduate education. Alternatively, the War Studies (WS) Program at RMC as well as MBA programs also offer great opportunities for advanced studies which could be relevant to the SAMP Branch. Normally, the candidate and the sponsor jointly set the parameters for in-depth research which is part of the thesis requirement and on successful completion of post-graduate training the candidate would be required to work for the sponsor. For the SAMP Branch this could translate into substantial development and expertise in the policy area.
 11. Incidentally, a number of post graduate students in the Strategic and Conflict Studies and WS programs from other occupations have conducted substantial research on Security and Intelligence, Internal Security and Regional Operations in Canada.
 12. The present Branch initiatives which are being pursued by DG SAMP/DPSPR (The Way Ahead and Resource Management Guide) and D Police Ops (Management of Police Investigations and the National Police Service (NPS)) are excellent examples of channelling and exploiting good ideas.
 13. Some of the actions taken as a result of the External Review of the Special Investigation Unit (SIU), 1990, also known as the Marin Report, have helped in 'de-mystifying' traditional perceptions of secrecy surrounding the SIU. However, some confusion has resulted with the removal of the criminal investigation responsibilities from the SIU.
 14. At present, much is being done to rationalize the counter-intelligence process/Security intelligence product, criminal intelligence, the D Secur Ops/CSIS interface, the roles of J2/G2, J3/G3 and SAMP staffs. Although, some of the aspects surrounding this process are sensitive and classified, much can be brought to the open in order to build a better understanding and consensus from all participants and stakeholders.
 15. There have been at least four major studies of SAMP activities and programs since 1990 (in addition to the wider NDHQ Functional and Capability Reviews). Some changes have occurred as a result of these reviews and I suspect more are forthcoming. Therefore, a Communication Strategy for the SAMP Branch might be appropriate.
 16. For instance, the 1991 CASIS Conference focused on 'oversight' and 'review' of all Security and Intelligence functions and organizations. Presentations and discussion papers were made from seven different countries.
 17. S.R. Elliot, Scarlet to Green: A History of Intelligence in the Canadian Army 1903-1963 (Toronto, 1981) and LCol D.R. Johnson, Ed., On Guard for Thee: The Silver Anniversary of the Security Branch (Winnipeg: Jostens Canada Limited, 1993) provide an excellent starting point for this endeavour. LCol Johnson and his team have provided the Branch with an outstanding 25th anniversary book from which further research and study can emanate.

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THE GEORGE WILKINSON ROOM

The Thunderbird Club

Building 69 located at CFB Esquimalt (Naden) is not like the other establishments owned by DND. To on-lookers, this building means little, if anything at all. To military police members however, it is their social gathering place. Although its informal name is the Thunderbird Club, the true name of building 69 is the "George Wilkinson Room". Built in 1921, the building was the home of a British family. The interesting history of various ownership is not the basis of its importance; but one of the children who grew up there went on to become an exceptional officer in the Provost Corps.

Born 25 Feb 1918, LCol (ret) George Wilkinson was three years old when his father, Arnold Wilkinson, decided to build his own house with the help of a French fellow named Cheval. Using second hand lumber from a destroyed

municipal building and Cheval's framing expertise, the two cleared the required acres of land and constructed a two story, quaint little house for the Wilkinson family.

George's earliest memory of the home was at the age of four and a half when the Wilkinson family moved in. Although not yet completed, the house at 1342 Liverpool Street looked very promising. It was a great place for a childhood upbringing. The lush surrounding of trees which gave it privacy from the nearest neighbour 1/4 of a mile away made it more enchanting. The forest also provided a vast selection of pine trees from which young George chose his Christmas trees. As well, the large field near the house, now the Naden parade square, hosted the soccer games of the local children. A memorable event was a small tournament between the local boys

and visiting young Bellhops from the "Express of Canada" ship.

Like his father who served in the 11th Hussars Regiment during WWI, George also joined the military. In April 1935, at 17 years of age, he enrolled in the militia as a member of the 17th Fortress Company Royal Canadian Engineers. That summer, he was transferred to the regular army of Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI). The waiting list to join the PPCLI was long but it was George's talent in soccer which brought him to the attention of the Army's soccer Captain. Soon, the local soccer field was deserted, for all its little soccer stars had joined the military. Of the pack, George was the only infanteer. The rest had joined the Canadian navy because it promised many sea adventures in foreign and far away lands. Thrilled with this opportunity, they teased George for joining the infantry. In April, George's infantry skills earned him a posting as a machine gunner on board the SS Sheaf Water; a defensively equipped merchant ship operating in the North Sea. George did not miss the opportunity to write to his friends who had not yet gone to sea since their enrolment.

In 1941, LCol (ret) Wilkinson transferred to the Canadian Provost Corps where he was promoted to the rank of Corporal in August 1942, Sergeant in October of the same year, and commissioned to Lieutenant in 1943. He was then posted to X 3 List 9 Battalion Canadian Reinforcements in May 1944. Three weeks following the D-day invasion, he was transferred to X 4 List 13 Reinforcement Battalion and sent to Normandy.



The George Wilkinson Room – CFB Esquimalt



There he was attached to 8 Company Canadian Provost Corps, 4th Canadian Armoured Division. According to a point system, he had finally earned enough points to return home. On 8 May 1945 (VE Day), George arrived in Canada and two weeks later on May 25, he married his pre-war sweetheart.

In 1942 while George was overseas, the Royal Canadian Navy expanded its property in Naden, took ownership of the Wilkinson house, and turned the residence into a temporary gunnery school. Six years later the Base Hospital used the building as a rehabilitation centre. On a trip to Naden following the war, George met with a childhood friend who worked in an engine room, (now

the Drill Hall) and decided to visit 1342 Liverpool Street. The land where his house used to be was empty. Thinking that the house had been demolished by the Royal Canadian Navy, George was surprised to see it standing further down the road, where it still stands today.


In October 1946, George agreed to remain in the Provost Corps and enrolled at the rank of Regimental Sergeant Major. Due to military procedures which required certain exams to be taken for the officer corps, George studied for the tests and was sent to officer training school at the age of 21 years.

The years which followed were quite interesting. At the


rank of Major in 1961, George was appointed Force Provost Marshall to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Gaza Strip. Later, the French courses he took at the University of Toronto helped to earn him the appointment of Command Provost Marshall to the 22e Royal Regiment in Quebec city. In 1962 he was promoted to LCol and in 1965, he was the Provost Marshall in Cyprus. In November 1967, after 33 remarkable years of service, LCol (ret) Wilkinson retired. Following his military service, LCol (ret) Wilkinson continued to offer his security expertise. First, he joined the Security Intelligence Division of the Department of External Affairs and was posted to Asia and based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia where he was appointed Regional security officer for Asia and Australia. Then, until his final retirement in August 1976, he served as the Director of Security Planning to the Minister of the Solicitor General.

The George Wilkinson Room is not just building 69, nor is it an ordinary military recreational establishment, but it is a house with an interesting history. Members of the Thunderbird Club are privileged to share the home of one of our founding fathers of the Military Police.

*Written by: OCdt N.Y.
Birgentzlen
- 5 July 1994*



Inside the Thunderbird Club



THE VALUE OF STRATEGIC DECEPTION

By Lt(N) R.S. Clarke

Deception is a necessity of war. Just as security is a principle of war and must be considered when planning operations, so too must deception be borne in mind, since it is the handmaiden of security.¹

As Security Branch personnel, we all have a role to play in conducting deceptive operations, since deception and security are so closely connected. The purpose of this article is to illustrate why we need to use deception and give some examples of how to use it.

At present, Canadian military deception is practised primarily at unit level depending on the Commanding Officer's intentions. Although some direction exists concerning particular actions which can be taken in specific instances, there is very little written down to demonstrate how, or to encourage commanders to think in terms of covering large scale military actions with a convincing cloak of strategic deception. This lack of cover proved somewhat embarrassing to the Navy during the late 1980's, as well as to other branches of the Armed Forces, and needs to be addressed. The next outbreak of hostilities may prove our deficiency in deception to be far worse than just embarrassing.

To begin our discussion we must first ask ourselves why we even bother with deception. The answer lies in the fact that when planning and executing large scale operations, it is virtually impossible to render the activity totally immune to watchful eyes. As military staffs are informed of an operation in order to begin planning for it, the risk of information becoming known to unintended recipients who may compromise the activity, increases


accordingly. Placing a deceptive cover over the operation can significantly reduce this degree of risk by obscuring some key aspect of the plan.

It must, however, be remembered who it is we are intending to deceive. Deception may not only be aimed at our enemies, but at the media, the public and in some cases, our own personnel. Simply telling the troops "not to talk" about operations may not suffice, but giving them a plausible cover story may convince them that there really is not anything worth talking about. They may also be misled in what is actually being planned so as to minimize the damage should they inadvertently reveal part of an operation. In either event, deception will have served its purpose: maintain the integrity of our operations by denying our adversaries the knowledge of our true intentions.

The necessity for deception in war can best be illustrated by Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of Europe in 1944. In order for the invasion to succeed, a huge number of Allied troops, along with their equipment, had to be assembled in England. The planners realized that, even though every effort would be made to conceal the dispersal of men and equipment, the fact that the Allies were planning a major assault could not go unnoticed by the Axis for long. Therefore, the Allies attempted to make the Germans think that when the invasion did come, it would push through either Italy, the Balkans, Denmark or even Norway.² In addition, the Allies convinced the Germans that the attack would not come before July 1944 and would only commence after a large scale Russian offensive had started in the East.

The Germans were led to believe that troops and equipment assembled in Southern England were actually small in number and only intended to be used if a landing of opportunity presented itself in France. Hitler was made to think that the major Allied build-ups were in North Africa and Eastern England for invasions of Southern Europe including the Balkans and Norway. In all, Plan Bodyguard, the Allies master deception plan, encompassed 36 separate sub-plans which were used to deceive the German Forces as to the actual time and location of the intended invasion.³

The intention of Plan Bodyguard was to force the Germans to spread their ground troops over such a wide area that they would be too dispersed to repel the actual invasion when D-Day finally arrived. In this regard the plan was quite successful, since twenty percent of the Wehrmacht's strength was tied up guarding areas in which the Allies had no strategic interest. When the invasion did come, the Germans could only commit a further twenty percent of their total strength to countering the Allied attack because the Wehrmacht had been heavily committed to guarding areas the Allies considered secondary targets. Even after D-Day, Allied deception continued to feed Hitler's notion that the landing was only a diversionary thrust and therefore, not worth committing large forces to combat. By the time the German General Staff had realized the attack was in fact the main Allied invasion, a firm beachhead had been established and pressure on Germany's Eastern Front prevented Hitler from launching effective counter-attacks in the West.



The example of Plan Bodyguard is well worth studying by Canadian Security Branch personnel today. Canada possesses limited quantities of manpower and equipment in her peacetime armed forces. Since our men and machines are few, we must rely on our wits to win battles. Deception can allow us to appear more menacing than we are, when we need it to. In the period before an outbreak of hostilities, various preparatory actions would be necessary. An effective deception cloak could mask our activities so that our adversaries would not be forewarned of our intentions.

War is not the only situation in which deception could be useful. Canada's Armed Forces may be called upon to conduct operations of an extremely sensitive nature in Canada or abroad. Deception may be necessary to prevent advanced warning or public scrutiny which could prove embarrassing to the government or compromising to operational security.

Even in peacetime, deception can be used to mask operational capabilities of the Armed Forces from potential aggressors. The denial of knowledge to the enemy of what the Forces will do and how it will be done when provoked, is a function not only of security but also of deception.

What can Canadian Forces personnel do to improve their capacity to deceive their adversaries? As Security Branch personnel, we must remember that deception

can be a useful tool in the conduct of security operations. We must become more capable of advising our superiors how to mask us, and then surprise enemies when and where they least expect us if we are to emerge victorious on the modern battlefield.⁴ This is an art which will have to be practised at all levels, but particularly by Security Staffs at larger formation headquarters, in order to be used effectively in war. Strategic deception will require high levels of planning and coordination to be effective. Planning will determine what information will alternately be denied or provided to the enemy, depending on whether we are cloaking ourselves or convincing him of our deception's authenticity by including some truth in the deception. Once the deceptive plan is set, the dissemination of information to the enemy will have to be carefully coordinated so that the enemy accepts it. As Colonel John Bevan, the Allies Controller of Deception in World War Two put it, "masses of misinformation could not simply be handed over to the Germans. It would have to be leaked in indirect and subtle ways...intelligence easily obtained was intelligence readily disbelieved."⁵ From this it can be seen that care must be taken in how we convey our cover to our opponents so that it is believable, and so that one deception does not prove counter-productive to another.

To accomplish this, coordinated planning and execution of deception will require a high level body which

is familiar with the various aspects of deception and the strategic objective. This organization will have to be fully aware of the Commander's intentions so that both a long-term plan, as well as momentary instances of opportunity, can be fully exploited, without compromising existing or proposed plans and operations. Commanders at all levels must have access to information concerning the establishment of deceptive operations in order for them to appreciate the potential that deception offers them. Security Branch Officers should also practice how to plan and prepare deceptive operations as part of their initial training, since counter-intelligence is a function of the Security Branch.

In closing, Security Staffs at all levels must be capable of advising commanders of the necessity for and value of deception. As has been proven in the past, those forces which are able to effectively utilize deception are in a significantly enhanced position to surprise their enemies and to deal them a decisive blow when needed.

ENDNOTES

1. Anthony C. Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies* (New York: Bantam Books, 1976), pg. 528
2. Brown, *Bodyguard...*, pg. 433
3. *Ibid*, pg. 434
4. Major John D. LeHockey, "Are We Deceiving Anyone?" *Proceedings*, (September 1989), pg. 53
5. Brown, *Bodyguard...*, pg. 436

