



National
Defence

Défense
nationale

Thunderbird



Commemorative Edition

Canada

The Thunderbird JOURNAL



Number 1, 1991

Contents

General

Letter from Branch Advisor 1

Feature articles

Up the Down Route 1

Special Investigation Unit
25th Anniversary Celebration 3

Murder investigation by Remote Control:
The Pepin Case 4

Commissioning the Ranks Plan (CFRD) 12

BSOC 9101 - "Operation Red Cap Leader" 13

Automation Update 14

From The Field

CFSIS Annual Curling Bonspiel, 1991 15

Memories

Mystery Photo Contest 16

(In Memorium)

L Col (retd) Raymond Theriault 17

Ernest K. Graves 17

MANAGING EDITOR

Maj. Wayne Boone

ASSISTANT MANAGING EDITOR

Lt. Bob Davies

GRAPHIC ARTIST

Ron Lalonde
DPGS 7-2

TRANSLATION SERVICES

Translation Bureau
Secretary of State

EDITORIAL POLICY

The Thunderbird Journal, the official journal of the Security Branch, is published quarterly and is an authorized DND periodical in accordance with CFAO 57-14

The aim of the **Thunderbird Journal** is to provide a focal point for the Branch activities, to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas, and to foster professionalism and esprit de corps.

Items suitable for publication in the **Thunderbird Journal** will vary in terms of topics and format but can include both items of Branch wide interest as well as more informal reports of local events. Articles may be submitted direct or through the normal chain of command subject to the approval of appropriate commanders as applicable.

Letters to the Editor, questions or editorial comment will be welcome, however, the Editorial Board reserves the right to reject articles considered unsuitable for publication.

The views expressed in any material published in this magazine are those of the authors and not necessarily of the DND or any element thereof.

Articles may be reprinted from this **Journal** without further permission providing credit is given to both the author and the **Thunderbird Journal**.

PUBLICATION SCHEDULE

Issue	Final Date of receipt of articles	Publication Date
Number 1/91 1	December 91 15	Mar 92
Number 2/92 16	June 92 15	Sept 92
Number 3/92 15	December 92 15	Mar 93

There is a twenty week lead time for submission of articles to DG Secur. This remains as the absolute minimum time necessary to meet the publication schedule allowing for translation, word processing and subsequent printing. Your adherence to these time restrictions would be greatly appreciated

Direct all correspondence to:

Managing Editor
The Thunderbird Journal
NDHQ/DG Secur
101 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, Ont. K1A 0K2



Letter from the Branch Advisor

by Col. A. R. Wells.

Time for another Journal, and I'm barely a step ahead of the Managing Editor and his *equipe de traducteurs*. My predecessor, Col McCullough, told me the best part of being DG Secur was the break in activity which allowed some time to think; I'm still waiting for that break.

The spring round of Regional Mess Dinners has now passed. Trenton, Montreal, Cornwallis and Lahr were the sponsoring sites in Central Canada, the East and in Europe. All dinners went extremely well, thanks to the firm hand of the PMC's. In addition to a fine menu, each dinner seems to have its own character. Central Region was probably the most sedate in conforming to Branch procedures and protocol; Eastern Region stood out with the largest attendance of retired members and unscheduled speakers; Atlantic Region made the greatest effort to work up an appetite, with time for two rounds of golf; and Lahr made a real effort to entertain those guests with jet lag by laying on an all-night dinner.

Back at the Ranch, the Branch still has a very high profile, and review of

our management of police and security operations is continuing. The impact analysis of the recommendations of the Judge Rene Marin External Review is nearing completion. Col R.J. Donovan will now head up the implementation process. There is still lots of work to be done to determine if a new MOC is necessary for the SIU, and to streamline security intelligence and counterintelligence operations. Following will be a Vertical Function Tracking Study to make recommendations regarding the full spectrum of the police and security service components of the Department's Security Program. All these studies, together with our management of ongoing operations and participation in other Defence projects, means that I and the staff of the Division are having no difficulty finding things to do.

Every once in a while amidst all the activity there is recognizable progress. Such was the case on 29 May when we obtained approval for those Military Police with peace officer status to wear the MP badge while on patrol or other police operationally deployed assignments. We have a unique situation in that we

wear the same uniform as the persons whom we police or to whom we provide police services. Within the Total Force concept there is the need for individual identification to the public of those MP who are trained to the required standard, and those MPs designated as peace officers. The former is accomplished via the red identifiers; the latter is satisfied with the MP badge. It took awhile, but the whole issue was finally clarified.

The deadline has arrived, with the Editor standing in my doorway. In closing I would like to recognize the special personal efforts that are being made to further professional competence on the job. We are in a profession which is coming increasingly under scrutiny. I would urge all of you to continue your efforts to develop your knowledge and skills in all areas of our occupation. While resources may dictate that training be shorter than we would like, I would counsel that you set your own standard for professional development as broadly and highly as personally possible. There is much satisfaction in personal achievement and a job well done. Q.Q

FEATURE ARTICLES

Up the Down Route

by Watchdog

"Hello all stations. This is 28 Alpha Mobile. How do you hear me, Over."

This particular column is being penned late on New Years Day during the worst winter my part of Canada has seen in 20 years. Housebound, I spent part of the day rummaging through some of papers collected over three odd decades of service. One of them took me back to an especially exciting week in the Autumn 1982.

On September 14 of that year, the President-elect of Lebanon, Bashir Gemayel, died in a bomb blast in the Ashrafiya District of East Beirut. Our Ambassador was off-post, so that the Charge d'Affaires and I were detailed to represent Canada at the funeral held in the mountains above the City the following day.

Accompanied by a Lebanese driver, we exited West Beirut in the armoured limousine, using the so-called Port Crossing of the Green Line. The

funeral itself was a nightmare, the first of three such events I would attend during my Lebanese sojourn. Arab funerals, whether they are for Christian or Moslem, follow a pattern similar to, but still somewhat different from, that we know. Just prior to the service, the immediate family received callers in a hall adjoining the Maronite Church in Gemayel's hometown of Bikfayya. Somehow I got separated from the Charge d'Affaires and other diplomats, and ended up



standing in a press of family and close friends as the coffin was "processed" through the throng.

At an Arab funeral, the coffin is moved through the mourners by passing it from hand to hand, high overhead. Grief and respect are shown by touching or batting the coffin.

The mourners numbered several thousand, and the noise, heat and aroma all defied description. Propelled by hundreds of hands, the coffin bounced first one way then the other, occasionally colliding with the heads of those taller than most others in the crowd. While I escaped this particular misadventure, one, potentially more dangerous, was in the making.

Caught in the press of people in the Nave, unable to move freely in any direction, I found myself forced off one leg and left standing on the other. I was unable to get my left leg back onto the floor. Increasingly, I found myself being bent further to one side, kept upright occasionally by the people pressing closely about me. Indeed, the squeeze was such that my left shoe was pulled off my foot, disappearing into the crowd.

By this stage, my fear was not one of a loss of a carefully blanched shoe, or even a loss of dignity, but rather one founded on a growing realization that I was, literally, all 200 pounds plus of me, being swept off my feet. It took no great intellect to know that if I fell I would have been trampled by that mob, with yours truly likely to join Bashir if I didn't get moving. Suffice it to say that I got well and truly stuck into things, and I trust that there are still a few Lebanese who bear the scar tissue resulting from this Canadian's declaration that I was entitled to my own *lebensraum* there in the church.

After the service, I was swept along in the funeral procession, right-foot following sticking-foot, down to the Town Square, where I encountered a Forces Lebanese captain, David something-or-other, from Philadelphia. He and I had met previously one after-

noon when Sergeant Michael Poulin and I got lost on the Green line in Baabda, and shared coffee with him in his bunker. In any event, he sent one of his militiamen back to the Church, and I and my shoe were shortly thereafter reunited. To the sound of thousands of weapons being fired into the air, Bashir was put to rest, following which I rejoined my Embassy colleagues and headed back to Beirut.

We were preceded on the road by the British Ambassador in his Bentley, with RMP close protection teams fore and aft. I should have known something was amiss when they reached the highway and swung North, away from the City. We went South and arrived back at the Port Crossing at dusk, finding it closed and swarming with Israeli troops and armour. There was a lot of artillery and mortar fire, all of it, fortunately, seemingly outgoing. Problem was, that meant it was incoming for our Embassy, on the other side, where my wife and others were sheltering.

Assured by the Israeli LO that the Crossing would not reopen for several days, we decided to have a go at the more central Museum Crossing, which had not been used by anyone in many days. Headlights on full, our Lebanese driver babbling incoherently, and our Canadian pennant


snapping in the breeze, we raced along the now dark and rubble-strewn streets. At the Museum Crossing there were none of the usual Lebanese police or military to be seen. Instead, waves of paratroopers from the Golani Brigade were darting forward through the hastily abandoned militia positions. Occasionally scattering them with blasts of our horn, we drove unscathed right through the Israeli assault, back into the Moslem-held Western half of the City.

By 10 o'clock, we were safe back in the Embassy, about 15 hours before Israeli armour and infantry arrived at our end of Sharia Hamra.

What I turned up in my papers this past New Years afternoon was the bill for the repair of my car. Tired after my day in the mountains, I had carelessly left it out on Sharia Hamra overnight and someone trashed it to the tune of LL1,900, about CDN \$700.00 at the time. At least neither I nor my shoe were in it at the time!

As I recall it, the MP guards lost two cars that same night and the RCMP LO had his partly flattened by an Israeli tank. Anyway, my bill is not marked "Paid", so I assume I charged it off to one or another impress account.

This is 28 Alpha Mobile out to you. QO



Special Investigation Unit 25th Anniversary Celebration

by Major David V. McElrea

On 3 April 1991 the Special Investigation Unit celebrated 25 years as an integrated Unit of the Canadian Armed Forces. Over the past quarter of a century, thousands of military and civilian members have served commanders and the Unit with professionalism and distinction.

The Special Investigation Unit was established on 1 April 1966 by Canadian Forces Organization Order 1.11. Modelled upon the former Royal Canadian Air Force Special Investigation Unit, it integrated those personnel who had previously performed counter intelligence and police functions for the Canadian Army and RCAF. The Unit consisted of 107 RCAF personnel, 64 C Int C members, 28 Provost, and 18 civilian staff, organized into six detachments with Headquarters at CFB Rockcliffe. During the past 25 years the Unit has evolved into a more modern and highly successful investigative organization, comprising seven detachments and 25 sections supported by 201 military personnel and 21 civilians. While the majority of military personnel continue to be members of the Security Branch, through the years personnel from other support trades have combined their expertise to enhance the operational viability of the Special Investigation Unit.

The role of the Unit has not changed significantly since its inception. Originally mandated to perform counter intelligence, conduct sensitive investigations, and conduct liaison on behalf of the Canadian Forces, the Unit remains committed to performing these functions, albeit with an increased level of expertise and demands being placed on our scarce resources. In 1971 the Special Operations Section was created, responsible for training Canadian Forces Military Attaches and providing technical assistance during complex and sensitive

investigations. In 1972 the Unit developed and implemented a polygraph capability for the Department, conducting its first examination in 1974. Since then the polygraph program has grown in importance and has served the CF well. At present, a polygraph examiner is located at each detachment, together with a Polygraph Standards Officer at SIU HQ.

In 1985 the SIU began to provide Close Personal Protection services for high-risk foreign officials visiting DND facilities and for senior Departmental officials travelling in Canada or Europe. Continuing intermittently throughout the mid 1980's, the CPP Program stabilized in October 1990 when an agreement was reached with the RCMP confirming that Force's primary jurisdiction in Canada.

Members have been employed in a variety of operational settings, demonstrating their flexibility in various ways. They continue to be deployed from coast to coast and in Europe; they see regular duties in such exotic

places as CFS Alert and Cyprus; and, for the first time in its history, they have supported military operations in the Bahrain and Qatar war theatre.

In 1990 the Unit was the subject of an external review conducted by the Honourable Rene Marin. Recommendations presented by the Chairman were accepted in principle by senior officials of this Department, which generated much discussion and rationalization of the Unit's mandate and "raison d'etre". Considerable staff effort continues in the examination, analysis and implementation of the committee's recommendations. Roles and organization of the SIU and Directorate of Security Clearances have already been modified. The end result of this process will undoubtedly reduce the scope of the Unit's involvement in certain types of investigations, broaden its mandate in the area of security, and streamline Departmental security clearance procedures in support of the Government Security Policy.



LCol J.R. Dallaire, OMM, CD, CO SIU presenting 25th Anniversary scroll to MGen (ret'd) A. Pickering, CD, Colonel-Commandant of the Security Branch.



From 1 April 1966 to 1 April 1991 the Unit has been commanded by officers representing the Land and Air elements, Security, and Intelligence Branches. They are listed below in chronological order:

1. 1966 -1967	S/L R.J. Jordan, CD	Air
2. 1967 -1970	Maj J.W. Gourlay, CD	Air
3. 1970 -1973	LCol A.J. Murtagh, CD	Air
4. 1973	Maj J.S. Dunn, CD	Land
5. 1973 -1976	LCol R.T. Hall, CD	Land
6. 1976 -1978	LCol J.D. Lumsden, CD	Land
7. 1978	Maj E.W. Roberts, CD	Air
8. 1978 - 1980	LCol G.L.R. Bruce, CD	Land (Int)
9. 1980 -1984	LCol P.A.H. Dupille, CD	Land
10. 1984 -1987	LCol J.R. Theriault, CD	Air
11. 1987 -1990	LCol P.C. MacLaren, CD	Land
12. 1990 -1991	LCol J.R. Dallaire, OMM, CD	Air

Since the 25th Anniversary celebration, command has changed once again. As of 23 May 1991, the first Sea element officer, Cdr J.C. Macquarrie, CD, is at the helm.

The anniversary celebrations consisted of a formal ceremony held at the CFB Ottawa(N), Rockcliffe Officers Mess, followed by a sit-down dinner for the officers and guests and a stand-up buffet for the other ranks and their guests.

The morning's ceremony included: marching in of the flag party, accom-

panied by piper CWO W. Gilmour; the Commanding Officer's address by LCol J.R. Dallaire; presentations of the 25th Anniversary Commemorative Scroll to the Chief Intelligence and Security, RAdm J.C. Slade, the Colonel Commandant of the Security Branch MGen (ret'd) A. Pickering, the DG Secur Col A.R. Wells, and nine of the

eleven former Commanding Officers; presentation of a Certificate of Appreciation on the occasion of the 25th Anniversary to selected civilian guests in recognition of their organizations' assistance to the SIU over the years; the Security Branch Prayer; the CIS address as guest of honour; a toast to the SIU; and, finally, the march out of the flags.

To mark the occasion, a copy of the 25th Anniversary Commemorative Scroll bearing the names of all SIU members serving on 1 April 1991 was presented to each member of the Unit.



Col A.R. Wells, CD, DG Secur, presenting 25th Anniversary scroll to S/L (ret'd) R.J. Jordan, CD, First CO of the Post Integration SIU.

In closing, LCol Dallaire wishes to convey his sincere appreciation to our civilian colleagues for services rendered over these past twenty-five years. "We enjoy and wish to maintain the professional relationship that currently exists among services". To all SIU members, "accept this commemorative scroll marking the occasion of our silver anniversary and God be with you in your future endeavours. See you in the year 2016 as you prepare to celebrate your fiftieth anniversary. Securitas Per Veritatem." Q.Q


Murder Investigation by Remote Control: The Pepin Case

by MWO Carter Lee, SIUS Lahr

An Overview

On 26 May 88, Cpl PEPIN and his girlfriend Monique BOLDUC (not her real name) left Lahr, West Germany in his orange Volkswagen "Bug" and headed east. They passed through West Germany and Austria and headed to the border of Austria and Hungary. There they obtained visas to visit Hungary and drove to an area in North Eastern Hungary near the border with the Soviet Union. Later,

many people in Hungary would remember them because they were a remarkable pair. He was tall, with dark hair cut in a military style, a body builder's physique, and neatly dressed. She was a very pretty, tall, and stately blonde with an almost aloof disposition. They remained in this area of Hungary for several days. They became involved in a disturbance at a border control point with the Soviet Union, which the Hungarian authorities later described as an attempted illegal border crossing.



MWO C.R. Lee, Special Investigation Unit Lahr



After this, the Hungarian authorities noted that they appeared to have separated for a short time. It was later learned that she had travelled to Romania without him. On 2 Jun 88 they were both arrested for separate incidents of attempted illegal border crossing into the Soviet Union. They were brought back together by the Hungarian police, their visas cancelled and told to leave Hungary within 48 hours by the same border crossing point in Austria through which they had entered.

That night they took a room in the Hotel Bereg in the town of Vasarosnameny. Cpl PEPIN parked his Volkswagen directly in front of the hotel. Although they may not have been aware, the car and hotel were kept under surveillance by the same Hungarian police lieutenant who had earlier cancelled their visas. During that evening, PEPIN and BOLDUC had an argument. She accused him of being a coward and a poor sexual partner. She said he should commit suicide, and offered to help him do so. She also threatened to report him to the Canadian embassy in Budapest. Monique then went to bed and slept. Cpl PEPIN did not sleep that night; he was frightened. His fright increased when sometime during the night the hotel room door was opened by a male person who looked into the room without speaking, then silently departed. His fright turned into paranoia. He knew that he could not stay in Hungary, but he also knew that Monique would not leave with him. She had made it clear to him that she would not return to West Germany. He no longer trusted her; it was obvious that she no longer loved him, if she ever had. He knew now that she had used him and he would not let her get away with that. He decided that he would leave Hungary quickly. But first, he would have to eliminate the threat that Monique represented to him and his country. He would kill her.

At first light Cpl PEPIN took his C7 rifle bayonet, which he had brought to Hungary with him, and stabbed Monique 11 times while she slept.

He cleaned her blood from the bayonet and washed his hands. Suddenly the enormity of what he had done dawned on him. He had killed the only person who had ever meant anything to him. He had nothing else to live for. Taking his bayonet, he attempted to kill himself by slashing his wrists but could not inflict a deep enough wound. He recalled that he had once been told that one could commit suicide easily by injecting alcohol into the bloodstream. He would need a syringe and some alcohol.

He cleaned up and looked for his car keys. He could not find them (they were later found underneath Monique's body on the bed). He went to the hotel reception desk, paid for the room, recovered his passport and explained to the clerk that Monique was tired and wanted to sleep for another hour. Outside the hotel he attempted to start his Volkswagen by crossing the ignition wires but was unsuccessful. He hitchhiked to a nearby town, Nyiregyhaza. There he purchased a bottle of cognac and a syringe and took a room in a hotel. In the hotel room he injected cognac into a vein in his arm in an attempt to kill himself. It did not work.

In the meantime, back in the Hotel Bereg, the Hungarian police lieutenant and the hotel staff had found Monique's body. A search for Cpl PEPIN was started immediately. He was not hard to find. Having failed to kill himself, he decided to turn himself in to the Hungarian authorities. He was arrested by the Hungarian police just as he was about to leave the hotel room in Nyiregyhaza. He did not resist.

During the next several days, the Hungarian police interviewed Cpl PEPIN three times. He was never mistreated or forced to make any statements. He was assigned a lawyer who attended the interviews. At each interview, he told essentially the same story. He admitted killing Monique because of a lover's quarrel. He

explained in detail how he had killed her, expressing deep remorse for having done so. He was retained in close custody by the Hungarian police while they completed their investigation.

International Diplomacy

On 6 Jun 88 Canadian Forces Europe Headquarters was advised by CSIS Bonn, through SIU Det Lahr, that a Miss Monique BOLDUC had been murdered in Hungary and that Cpl Christian PEPIN, a member of the CF, was in custody in Hungary and charged with murder. This communiqué started the legal and diplomatic ball rolling. Senior Legal Advisor Europe (SLAE) was appointed and tasked by the CFE Commander as the OPI and clearinghouse for all information regarding the PEPIN case. Almost simultaneously, the Canadian Department of External Affairs, at the request of the CF, began negotiations with the Hungarian government aimed at transferring legal jurisdiction to Canadian officials. These negotiations were soon broadened to include the request that, in the event that jurisdiction was handed over to the CF, legal and investigative personnel would be allowed to visit Hungary.

The SIU was not tasked immediately to investigate. However, SLAE, using the presumption that SIU would be tasked eventually, kept us informed of all information coming out of Hungary and of all developments in the diplomatic negotiation process. It was SLAE's opinion at this time that Cpl PEPIN would likely be returned to CF jurisdiction. He based this opinion on the fact that, although the alleged crime had been committed in Hungary, both parties were Canadian citizens and this would likely cause the Hungarian authorities to be less interested in prosecuting than if the victim had been a Hungarian citizen. It turned out that SLAE was correct.



Preliminary Inquiries

Although the SIU was given no immediate mandate to investigate this murder, an ongoing investigation was being conducted by SIUS Lahr into Monique BOLDUC's activities. This investigation had begun several months prior to her death, and mainly concerned her frequent travels to East Germany and the Soviet Union. The main investigator in this case, WO (now MWO) Yvon MORASSE, Deputy Section Commander of SIUS Lahr, now expanded this investigation to include the collection of as much information about Cpl PEPIN and his relationship with Monique as was available.

WO MORASSE's investigation during Jun 88 centered mainly on an in-depth study of all existing documents, personal files, medical files, etc., concerning Cpl PEPIN and Monique, as well as interviews with their supervisors, co-workers, friends and acquaintances. This, and previous inquiries concerning Monique, enabled us to develop the following personality profiles.

Monique BOLDUC was the 21-year-old daughter of a Warrant Officer serving in Lahr with the First Battalion of the Royal Twenty Second Regiment (1 R22ndR), the "Vandoos". She had a history of juvenile delinquency in Quebec while her father was posted there. She was an impulsive and headstrong person. Her mother had been the only person who had had any real influence over Monique's life. After her arrival in Lahr in 1984 she completed high school without further incident. She then worked as a security gate guard at CFB Lahr.

In Oct 86 her mother became terminally ill, passing away in Nov 87. Always headstrong, she became more so after her mother's death, to the point where her father had virtually no control over her. She began to cohabit sporadically with young soldiers, mostly from her father's regiment. She was known to use soft drugs and was fast gaining a bad

reputation. In late 1987, she began to travel to scheduled countries, primarily East Germany and, in Feb 88, to the Soviet Union. She did not receive official permission for these visits, as her job as a security guard required. Because of this, she was dismissed from her job in late Feb 88. After her dismissal her father attempted to return her to Canada but she refused to go. She had known Cpl PEPIN for about two years but it was not until early Apr 88 that they formed a close personal relationship. In the spring of 88 she confided to several friends that she intended to return to the Soviet Union, that Cpl PEPIN had threatened to kill her if she ever tried to leave him, and that she had dreamt of being stabbed.

Cpl Christian PEPIN was a 27-year-old infantryman with the First Battalion, Royal Twenty Second Regiment (1R22ndR) in Lahr. At the time of the murder he had served in Germany for almost four years and it was well known among his acquaintances (he had very few friends) that he liked Germany and did not want to return to Canada. Little else could be determined at this point about his personal life prior to joining the army. His service record indicated that he was a continual disciplinary problem, having been convicted several times for impaired driving and AWA. He had once travelled through East Germany to West Berlin without permission. He had the reputation within his unit as a hard drinking, Rambo type soldier who believed there was not enough excitement in the Canadian army. Because of his abnormal behaviour his immediate superiors convinced him to see a psychiatrist. He was evaluated by a mental health nurse who recommended him for psychiatric counselling and made an appointment for him with a resident psychiatrist at CFB Lahr. He never kept the appointment. Records showed that in 1982 while on recruit training he had attempted suicide. In May 88, on the pretext that he needed furniture because his girlfriend was moving in with him, he asked for and received a sizeable pay advance.

During these preliminary inquiries, WO MORASSE obtained from a German magistrate a warrant to search Cpl PEPIN's apartment. This was necessary because Cpl PEPIN's unit wished to collect any belongings remaining there, as is routine in cases where servicemen are AWA. The search revealed that Cpl PEPIN had taken most of his military gear with him and that apparently he had not purchased furniture with the pay advance as the apartment was almost empty. WO MORASSE seized a pair of bolt cutters from the apartment which forensics later showed to have been used to cut the fence of a maintenance compound at CFB Lahr several days before Cpl PEPIN and Monique left Lahr. Monique had worked as a security guard at this compound in Reigel, some 20 km south of Lahr.

On 16 Jun 89, Monique's remains were sent back to Lahr for burial. Prior to release to her next of kin, and at the request of the SIU, the Lahr Military police Section took custody of the remains for positive identification, medical examination and autopsy. The autopsy was requested because at that point no information from Hungary indicated that one had been conducted and we were unaware of the standards of autopsies in Hungary. Investigators from SIUS Lahr accompanied the MP investigators during this process. A visual inspection of Monique's remains revealed that an autopsy had been conducted in Hungary. There were a total of 11 stab wounds in the front upper body, one near the center chest very close to the heart. (The autopsy later conducted in Germany confirmed the autopsy report from Hungary in showing that this was most likely the first wound inflicted and the one which caused her death). During this visual inspection the overriding impression of each investigator was that the stab wounds appeared to have been inflicted while the victim was asleep or otherwise comatose as there was no indication of a struggle. During the autopsy, conducted at the Federal Institute of Forensic Medicine



in Freiburg, West Germany, WO MORASSE asked that a portion of the victim's spine and ribcage, which bore what appeared to be marks made by the murder weapon, be removed and held for forensic comparison with any weapon that might later be found. The pathologist agreed but said the preserving process would take several weeks. WO MORASSE believed that the pathologist understood his needs as an investigator but unfortunately such was not the case. When a suspected murder weapon eventually came into his possession, WO MORASSE recovered the bone from the pathologist only to find that the preserving process had caused the bones to shrink and become porous to the extent that positive comparison with the weapon was impossible. (There is a lesson somewhere in this for all you budding young investigators, and for some of us older ones as well. Don't ever assume that a pathologist always knows what you, as an investigator, need. When you collect cadaver parts as evidence, collect them as they are, preserved only by refrigeration, alcohol or formaldehyde, and transport them to a Forensic lab as soon as possible).

As I mentioned, SLAE was keeping the SIU informed on information from Hungary. During Jun 88 that information was rudimentary, gleaned mostly from contact with the First Secretary at the Canadian embassy in Budapest. It was known that Cpl PEPIN had admitted to killing Monique, was in custody awaiting disposition of his case, and the weapon was apparently a rifle bayonet. He had apparently refused to discuss his presence in Hungary or his reason for killing Monique, except to say that it was a lover's quarrel.

The Tasking

On 7 Jul 88 a tasking order was issued by HQ CFE, SO2 Secur, requesting SIU assistance to investigate the alleged murder in anticipation that Canada would be given jurisdiction. It also charged both MP section, Lahr and Baden, to assist the SIU as required and specifically charged CFB

Baden MP Section to provide Sgt Andy KISH to SIUS Lahr as a Hungarian interpreter when and if necessary. On the same day we were advised that LCol Denis COUTURE from the SLAE office was assigned as the prosecutor in this case. He authorized direct liaison between my section and LCol COUTURE.

On receipt of the tasking order, the Det Commander, SIU Det Lahr, asked for the assistance of another investigator from Canada to help offset the already heavy workload of the SIUS Lahr. This assistance was immediately provided in the person of MWO Ray BERNIER, the Section Commander of SIUS North Bay. Several days later MWO BERNIER arrived in Lahr, and along with WO MORASSE became the primary investigative team in this case. Although Ray did not know it then, he was to become the most travelled SIU investigator in history.

The Investigation

The team was established with MWO BERNIER and WO MORASSE doing the leg work, and with me providing the administrative and logistical support along with fatherly advice. We briefed LCol COUTURE on all information so far obtained, informed him of the steps we planned to take, and accepted any advice he might have. He had plenty, and questions too...

While still awaiting handover of jurisdiction, we planned to retrace WO MORASSE's steps and recollect all of the information of which he was aware in accordance with the rules of evidence. (WO MORASSE's inquiries had been conducted as part of a security/counter-intelligence investigation and therefore not necessarily in accordance with evidentiary rules related to the taking of statements, warnings or cautions, etc.). We knew that this would, and eventually did, take the team back to Canada because some of the witnesses had since been posted. We also suspected that in Canada there probably would still be records of Cpl PEPIN's attempted

suicide and subsequent psychiatric evaluation and/or treatment.

LCol COUTURE first promised that it would never be his intention to dictate to SIU investigators how to investigate this matter. He would, however, provide us with elements of required information in order to mount an effective prosecution. He also promised that he was available on a 24/7 basis to provide any legal help or advice. He then provided and discussed with us a list of specific questions to which he required answers and he concurred with our investigative plan. His questions, the specifics of which are too lengthy for this article, served to give us confidence that we, the investigative team, and the prosecutor were heading in the same direction.

Because of the unusual complications of this investigation, the rapport between the SIU investigators and the prosecutor was very close and cooperative. The contents of the report could not be and never were a surprise to him as he followed the progress of the investigation on an almost day-to-day basis. The only slightly disconcerting aspect of this close rapport was when, from the beginning, I detected an attitude that he considered the investigative team as being at his disposal for prosecution work only and not, as our branch policy dictates, a totally impartial investigative body. I broached this subject with LCol COUTURE and he explained to me a point of view which, I must confess, I learned to have sympathy for. He explained as a practicing lawyer in criminal cases he and his colleagues are required to work within the Canadian justice system, an adversarial system which uses a legal instrument known as disclosure. Disclosure occurs when an indictment is rendered in a civilian court or in the military when a formal charge is laid. Prior to disclosure the known facts of the case should not be made known by the police to other than the crown prosecutor; a defence counsel would have no access. This instrument is in place so as not to create a disadvantage to the prosecu-



tor who has the burden of proof. LCol COUTURE felt very strongly that the Security Branch policy of impartial investigation and reporting creates the potential of unfair advantage by a defence counsel as it gives him the ability to gain access to the facts before the charge is laid. Although as a policeman I agree with LCol COUTURE on this point, I did not want to allow myself or my investigators to contravene Security Branch policy. To prevent this, I made a great Canadian compromise. I told him that, if the defence Council in this case contacted the SIU requesting information, the request would not be denied, but the information would be passed to him, the prosecutor, for clearance and onward transmission to the defence. LCol COUTURE agreed to this plan and if he harboured any thoughts that we were passing the buck, he remained a gentleman and never said so.

During the remainder of July and August 88, MWO BERNIER and WO MORASSE continued their in-depth background investigation of Cpl PEPIN and Monique, both in Lahr and in Canada. The result of this investigation was a very comprehensive picture of the lives of both people up to the time they departed Lahr for Hungary. More importantly, it was now possible to produce witnesses and documentary evidence to show that Monique and Cpl PEPIN had intended to go to the Soviet Union (although their motives were unclear), that Cpl PEPIN had been known to threaten Monique's life, that they had planned the trip together and that Cpl PEPIN had a history of mental instability, having been diagnosed by one psychiatrist as dangerous. While none of this was conclusive proof that he had committed murder, it was good circumstantial and supportive evidence.

About mid-Jul 88 the investigative team had to split up for a short period. MWO BERNIER had to return to Canada for an urgent family crisis. In fact, he had started the crisis about nine months previous; he was about to become a father. Having dealt

successfully with this blessed event, he began the Canadian phase of his inquiries. Meanwhile, on 6 July 88, the Hungarian government agreed to hand over jurisdiction to the Canadian government. Due to a hiccup in the diplomatic message process, HQ CFE was not made aware of that decision until 15 Jul 88. In its communiqué the Hungarian government stipulated that the handover would be conducted in three phases, each depending on the successful completion of the preceding one. First would be the physical transfer of Cpl PEPIN along with his personal effects to Canadian custody. Second, would be the the Hungarian police investigative report, related physical evidence and its acquisition by Canadian authorities. Finally, if considered necessary, a visit would be made by Canadian legal authorities and investigators to Hungary. It was also stipulated that no independent investigation by Canadian investigators would be permitted in Hungary.

LCol COUTURE and I immediately began to set up the logistical, administrative and legal procedures necessary to recover Cpl PEPIN from Hungarian custody. This was not a difficult task. We sought the assistance of the First Secretary of the Canadian embassy in Budapest who agreed to assign two of his security guards, who are Canadian Military policemen, to take custody of Cpl PEPIN and his personal effects from the Hungarian police. They would escort him by air to Frankfurt, West Germany where we would meet them. The First Secretary made the necessary arrangements with the Hungarian authorities. I briefed the senior security guard, MCpl LEGARDE, by telephone. Because MCpl LEGARDE would be the first Canadian person in authority with whom Cpl PEPIN would have contact, I instructed him to place Cpl PEPIN under arrest for the offence of murder and to ensure that his rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights were thoroughly protected. I provided MCpl LEGARDE with the Ottawa telephone number of Cpl PEPIN's assigned legal

counsel, LCol MENARD, and instructed him to give Cpl PEPIN ample opportunity to call LCol MENARD at any time from whatever place was most convenient. I also cautioned MCpl LEGARDE not to discuss the case with Cpl PEPIN but to take written notes of everything we knew about Cpl PEPIN's personality, and of our assessment that he could be dangerous and try to escape. I advised him to keep Cpl PEPIN in mechanical restraints during the trip to Frankfurt. It turned out that the Hungarian police would not release Cpl PEPIN to MCpl LEGARDE's custody until he and his assistant custodian, Cpl CHOUINARD, were seated on the Hungarian Airlines (MALEV) flight that was to take them to Frankfurt. Because of this, MCpl LEGARDE could not give Cpl PEPIN immediate opportunity to call his lawyer. He did, however, perform the arrest procedure on the aircraft and restrained his prisoner. WO MORASSE and I met MCpl LEGARDE, Cpl CHOUINARD and Cpl PEPIN at the airport in Frankfurt, West Germany, shortly before noon on 10 Aug 88. We were accompanied, by prior arrangement, by two MP custodians from the Lahr military police section who took custody of Cpl PEPIN and transported him to the MP detention centre in Lahr. We also enlisted the help of the Consul from the Canadian embassy in Bonn, West Germany, who met us at the Frankfurt airport and paved the way for us to take Cpl PEPIN safely and without delay through West German customs and immigration. This transfer, although it took several weeks to arrange, went smoothly, and by 1400 hrs, 10 Aug 88, Cpl PEPIN was safe in a cell at LMPS and had spoken with his lawyer in Ottawa.

It happened that the second phase of the jurisdictional handover occurred at the same time as the first. Shortly before Cpl PEPIN was to be handed over to MCpl LEGARDE, a package was delivered by courier (actually a taxi driver) to the Canadian embassy in Budapest. It was from the Hungarian Deputy prosecutor



General's office. It was routinely accepted and signed for by a receptionist at the embassy. She opened the envelope and saw two large knives and two bound documents written in the Hungarian language. She recognized the names PEPIN and BOLDUC on the documents and, realizing it related to the BOLDUC murder, immediately brought it to the First Secretary. The First Secretary briefly looked into the envelope, saw the knives, resealed it and placed it in his safe. He then informed LCol COUTURE who informed me. This occurred on 4 Aug 88. After discussion with me, LCol COUTURE called the First Secretary and asked him to give the package to MCpl LEGARDE under diplomatic cover (diplomatic bag) to be hand carried by him to us at the same time as he escorted Cpl PEPIN to Frankfurt. The First Secretary agreed. I then called MCpl LEGARDE and asked him to get a written statutory declaration from the receptionist and the First Secretary outlining their involvement with what we believed to be the reports and physical evidence pertaining to this case. We required these declarations in an effort to prevent any further damage to the continuity of possession of this evidence. (Who was that taxi driver anyway?)

The only other hiccup in the first two handover phases was that two suitcases and a kit bag suspected to contain Cpl PEPIN's and Monique's personal effects could not be put on the Malev flight to Frankfurt. They were left in the custody of the Canadian embassy in Budapest and, later in Aug 88, brought under diplomatic cover by MCpl LEGARDE to SIUS Lahr. As we suspected, this luggage did contain the personal effects and clothing of Cpl PEPIN and Monique. Most notable was the fact that Cpl PEPIN had taken all of his military uniforms, dress and combat, to Hungary with him.

At the Frankfurt airport on 10 Aug 88, MCpl LEGARDE turned over to WO MORASSE and me a sealed diplomatic bag containing the package which had been delivered to the

Canadian embassy in Budapest on 4 Aug 88. We opened this package and itemized its contents. We found a wooden handled hunting knife with a tag, transparent wax paper envelopes containing hair and fingernail clippings, Miss BOLDUC's Canadian passport, and two thick, bound documents which appeared to be the Hungarian police report. One book was a pictorial account of the investigation starting with pictures of the hotel, with an orange CF registered Volkswagen bug parked in front, and proceeding through pictures of the crime scene and autopsy. The other book was a manuscript in the Hungarian language.

I immediately asked MWO BERNIER to return to Lahr so that he and WO MORASSE could interview Cpl PEPIN. I should point out that because this investigation was being conducted during the active posting season, SIUS Lahr had only one French speaking investigator, WO MORASSE, and, although Cpl PEPIN could speak some English, I thought it prudent to have any conversation with him in the French language. At the same time WO MORASSE and I photocopied the Hungarian police report in preparation for translation.

On 16 Aug 88, MWO BERNIER and WO MORASSE interviewed Cpl PEPIN for the first time. The interview was short. Cpl PEPIN refused to discuss Monique's death or any other aspect of this case except to say "you can be sure that I did not betray my country."

Several days later MWO BERNIER and WO MORASSE returned to Canada to complete their inquiries. They also delivered the photocopies of the Hungarian police report to SIU HQ where arrangements were made to have it translated into English and French. When the investigation was complete in Canada, WO MORASSE returned to Lahr and MWO BERNIER remained in Canada, there being little that the team could do until the Hungarian police report was translated. It was 4 Oct 88 before the first working copy was available.

During the second week of Oct 88, when both French and English copies (in rough) of the Hungarian police report were available, MWO BERNIER returned to Lahr with his toothbrush in his shirt pocket. The team, along with LCol COUTURE, then began a painstaking review of the report to determine if it contained sufficient evidence to charge Cpl PEPIN with murder and if the evidence would be acceptable in a Canadian Court Martial.

The report listed 40 persons from the police, legal, medical and forensic science professions, three interpreters, and twenty official witnesses who were involved in this case in Hungary. Generally, although many legal procedural differences were evident, the Hungarian police appeared to have conducted this investigation in much the same way as we, or any other North American police force, would have. Specifically however, their final conclusion that Cpl PEPIN was guilty was based mainly on his admission. All other evidence of his guilt was largely circumstantial. Not being familiar with the Hungarian justice system we could only conclude that probably the circumstantial evidence, plus his admission, would have been sufficient to convict Cpl PEPIN in a Hungarian court.

After review, LCol COUTURE concluded that the weight of circumstantial evidence in this case was sufficient to lay a charge of first degree murder against Cpl PEPIN and he took the necessary action to ensure that this was done. He had serious doubts about the admissibility in a Canadian Court Martial of Cpl PEPIN's signed admission. Cpl PEPIN had been interviewed on 4, 7, and 13 Jun 88. Present at these interviews, which were called "hearings" in the Hungarian police report, had been several policemen, a secretary, an interpreter, a public prosecutor, and Cpl PEPIN's Hungarian lawyer. On 13 Jun 88 Cpl PEPIN signed a statement in which he admitted killing Monique because of a lover's quarrel, explained how he had done



so and expressed remorse. The Hungarian police report indicated that his statement had been dictated through the interpreter to the secretary using a recording device. The secretary had typed the statement in the Hungarian language and, after it was read back to him by the interpreter in the French language, Cpl PEPIN had signed the Hungarian language document. There was no indication that a voice recording had been preserved as evidence.

Because of the possible inadmissibility of Cpl PEPIN's statement to Hungarian police it was decided to attempt to elicit a similar statement from him under Canadian rules of evidence. Accordingly, on 12 Oct 88 MWO BERNIER, assisted by Sgt PILON of SIUS Lahr, interviewed Cpl PEPIN for the second time. This interview yielded less information from Cpl PEPIN than did the first. He simply would not discuss any aspect of this case.

It is not possible in this article to discuss all of the evidence presented in the Hungarian police report. The only physical evidence considered valuable by the Hungarians was the hunting knife, the C7 bayonet, and the hair and fingernail clippings taken from the deceased at the autopsy. The pathologist chose the bayonet as the weapon most likely used although forensic examination revealed no fingerprints or identifiable blood on it. The West German pathologist who conducted the second autopsy independently made the same choice based on the shape and depth of the wounds. There was only circumstantial evidence to link this bayonet to Cpl PEPIN: his admission, and the fact that his bayonet was not among the few effects he had left behind in Lahr. The hair and fingernail clippings had been removed routinely from the deceased at the autopsy but had not been further examined nor had control samples been provided to facilitate such examination. Most other evidence was, as I have said, circumstantial but the preponderance of it was sufficient in the prosecutor's view to gain a conviction.

There were a number of points in the Hungarian police report, both procedural and factual, which required clarification. Chief among these was the possible existence of a recording of Cpl PEPIN's admission. The only way to clarify these points was to talk to the police investigators and witnesses in Hungary. It was also vital that the prosecutor, LCol COUTURE, speak personally with any witnesses he wished to call. Accordingly, LCol COUTURE applied for permission for himself and the SIU investigative team to travel to Hungary. I had already begun the administrative process to facilitate this trip, such as the procurement of green diplomatic passports for both the prosecutor and the investigative team. While awaiting this permission, MWO BERNIER returned to Canada to learn how to change diapers.

MWO BERNIER's sojourn in Canada was short lived, as permission to travel to Hungary came quickly. On the morning of 31 Oct 88, LCol COUTURE, resplendent in a blue pin striped three piece suit, and WO MORASSE, pockets bulging with \$5000 US, left Lahr by road. They picked up our interpreter, Sgt Andy KISH, in Baden and proceeded to the Frankfurt airport. There they met MWO BERNIER (what day is this?) who had flown from Canada and within hours all four were in Budapest, Hungary.

The team was received cordially by the Hungarian authorities. Although not permitted to investigate independently, they were permitted to talk in the presence of the original police investigator with most of the other police persons and witnesses who were involved in the case. They discovered that no machine recording had been made of Cpl PEPIN's admission. At each of Cpl PEPIN's interviews, the policeman conducting the interview would dictate what Cpl PEPIN had said to the secretary, who would type the statement. It would then be read back to Cpl PEPIN in French by the interpreter and Cpl PEPIN would sign the Hungarian language statement. The team had

some questions regarding the initial security and search of the crime scene. While pursuing this matter, they talked with a policeman from the Vasarosnameny police station who had been detailed to guard the scene pending the arrival of the "Site Inspection Team" from the area police Headquarters in Nyiregyhaza. He said that before the site inspection team arrived he had allowed several other persons to enter the scene. He said he did not know who these people were and he took no written notes of their presence or actions. The SIU investigative team formed the impression that this policeman was not at liberty to identify those people. Later, while talking with the Hungarian police lieutenant who had found Monique's body (the same person who had cancelled Cpl PEPIN's and Monique's visas and who had kept them under surveillance), they found him somewhat reluctant to discuss some aspects of his involvement except in the presence of the local prosecutor. It was also learned in Hungary that the Hungarian authorities were aware of Cpl PEPIN's and Monique's intention to go to the Soviet Union. Based on this evidence, the SIU team came to what I believe is the correct conclusion, that the Hungarian police were well aware of the double-barrelled nature of this incident and had done their best to separate the criminal from the security aspects. In all likelihood the police lieutenant who had found the body was not, in fact, a policeman but a security agent and probably the people who had inspected the crime scene before the arrival of the site inspection team were his men. In all other respects the visit to Hungary went well and all points were clarified to the satisfaction of the prosecutor.

In the meantime, LCol COUTURE had hired his own interpreter and was following in the footsteps (no mean feat) of the investigators. He interviewed and selected the witnesses he wished to testify at the Court Martial. Most witnesses indicated to him that they had no objection, if their government would permit it, to travelling to



West Germany to testify. He was told by Hungarian government authorities that they would give permission for their citizens to travel to West Germany but that they would not compel them to do so.

On 12 Nov 88, MWO BERNIER, having drafted his final report while in Hungary, returned to Canada with full intentions of submitting a general allowance claim for a new set of luggage. WO MORASSE returned to Lahr to tie up a few loose ends in this investigation. Sgt KISH had returned to his unit several days earlier and LCol COUTURE returned several days later to begin preparing his case as well as setting up the monumental administrative structure required to bring witnesses from Hungary to West Germany.

One very loose end that I wanted WO MORASSE to deal with was Cpl PEPIN. After discussion with LCol COUTURE, we decided that Cpl PEPIN should be given one last chance to tell us his story. On 30 Nov 88, WO MORASSE and Sgt PILON interviewed him for the third and last time with exactly the same result as the previous two. He steadfastly refused to say anything. We submitted our final report on 5 Jan 89, and Cpl PEPIN's trial date was tentatively set for 6 Mar 89.

As I have said, during this long and complicated investigation, SIUS Lahr worked very closely with the prosecutor, LCol COUTURE. I discovered very early that he is a person imbued with an infectious optimism and a straight-forward approach. It turned out that during his case preparation he needed these qualities and more. One-by-one his prime Hungarian witnesses dropped out refusing to come to West Germany to testify. Of course, it was impossible to compel a witness from another country to testify. He was left with only a few minor witnesses and those Canadian witnesses who could be compelled. Nevertheless he forged ahead.

The Trial

Cpl PEPIN's general Court Martial, on a charge of first degree murder, began on 6 Mar 89 and ended on 18 Mar 89. The first four days of the trial were taken up with two motions for dismissal by the defence and the related arguments surrounding each. While it is not possible to detail all of the arguments presented by the defence (the court transcript of this phase is six inches thick), I will run the risk of oversimplifying and deal with each.

The first motion for dismissal challenged the Court Martial's jurisdiction to try Cpl PEPIN on the grounds that the offence was not related to the Military and had occurred outside the jurisdiction of the Canadian Forces. This motion was denied because Cpl PEPIN was at the time of the offence subject to the Code of Service Discipline and jurisdiction had been sought from and granted by the court of primary jurisdiction in Hungary.

The second motion concerned Cpl PEPIN's custody before trial. Section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights stipulates that notwithstanding military rules and regulations applicable to Courts Martial, a person being tried by a Court Martial is still entitled to his rights under the Charter. It was argued therefore that Cpl PEPIN's retention in close custody before trial amounted to improper detention under Section 11E of the Charter. This motion was also denied because it could be demonstrated that Cpl PEPIN was afforded, and did exercise, all of his rights to be freed from custody under the applicable military regulations including petition to the Minister of National Defence. This petition had been denied by the Minister mainly on the grounds that Cpl PEPIN was an alleged deserter.

On the fifth day of the trial, having exhausted his arguments for dismissal, the defence entered a plea of guilty to the lesser offence of manslaughter. The court accepted this plea and allowed the prosecutor to read into evidence a brief of the cir-

cumstances leading up to the laying of charges and a description of available supporting evidence. No prosecution witnesses were called and thereafter the prosecutor was required to remain silent.

The remainder of the Court Martial was taken up hearing testimony from defence witnesses. This testimony was mainly from persons who could give evidence of Cpl PEPIN's work habits, character, and mental state. A psychiatrist who had examined Cpl PEPIN testified for almost two days. The bottom line of this testimony was that Cpl PEPIN suffers from a personality disorder known as narcissism which is capable of causing severe anti-social behaviour. On 18 Mar 89, Cpl PEPIN was sentenced to five years in prison.

Footnote

When I was asked by my Commanding Officer to produce this article, he gave me a number of guidelines. Among these was "a discussion of the suitability of Canadian MP and/or SIU Investigators with their experience and training to deal with a case such as this." This guideline most certainly deserves a response and I hope the following paragraphs do not sound too self-serving.

First, the issue of training, on which I feel I am fairly competent to comment having spent almost a third of my twenty-nine-year career working in our training system. That experience alone has convinced me that we should take a back seat to no one in this area. We have always trained our investigators to analyze offences by breaking them down into their various parts so that the required elements of proof are clear. Our investigators are also well trained in the technical and other methods of collecting the elements of information necessary to produce that proof. There is one area of our training which I believe could be improved and that is the collection of physical evidence for forensic examination. This subject is taught well to our senior courses, such as the Investigator



(AV) Course, but I think we have lost sight of the fact that all MPs are investigators to some degree. We should begin to teach this subject in detail on earlier career courses such as TQ5. It is not always true that the more serious offences are more difficult to investigate. Theft, for instance, is probably the most difficult offence to investigate because its elements of proof are more numerous and legally complicated than most others, yet our junior people are tasked routinely to investigate such acts. Murder, on the other hand, is a relatively simple offence to investigate, its elements are fewer and, except for the aura of urgency and seriousness, is an easier offence to prove.

In order for an investigator to be competent, experience must be added to his good training. How often have you heard it said that investigators are not made in the classroom but on the street. Of course that is a motherhood statement with which no rea-

sonable person could disagree. We have had very few murders to investigate in the Canadian Forces, and naturally, we hope this trend continues. However, it does not give our investigators the experience to become as competent as they could be in this area. I do not believe that this circumstantial lack of experience makes our investigators less suitable to investigate a murder. They are resourceful enough to seek the help and advice of other more experienced people when needed and we normally have the time and resources necessary to collect, as in this case, far more background supporting evidence than our civilian counterparts do.

In all fairness, I must point out that in this case we really did not investigate a murder. The Hungarian police did. What we did was analyze their investigation and evidence and attempt to make it fit the Canadian rules of evidence. When we did this we knew that the evidence produced by their investigation was not strong

enough for a conviction. However, when it was added to the evidence we had collected it gave the prosecutor the ability to conduct his prosecution in such a manner that a guilty plea was forthcoming. In SIUS Lahr we make it a policy not to argue with success.

Another guideline given by my Commanding Officer was that the security issues should be ignored where possible. I have attempted to do that but, as you now surely realize, it would be impossible to tell this story and ignore the security aspects totally. In any investigation the fundamental questions, "Who? What? When? Where? How? and Why?" must be answered. All of these questions were answered in this case. In telling this story I could not, for national security reasons answer the question definitively, "Why?" There is much more to this story than can be told at the moment and when and if it can be told I hope I am around to tell it to you. Q_Q

Securitas

Commissioning from the Ranks Plan (CFRP)

1. There has been some misunderstanding of late on the policy for the Commissioning from the Ranks Plan (CFRP). Primarily, concerns have centred on why in some years personnel receive their commissions under CFRP, while in other years, it appears that no one is commissioned under CFRP despite the nomination of several candidates. The intent of this article is to explain current policy with regard to the CFRP.
2. The purpose of CFRP is to provide a source of officers for the Regular Force to augment the number of officers commissioned through other plans. CFRP is a nomination program and CF members are not invited to apply for commissioning. The onus is therefore, on the Commanding Officer to identify potential candidates each year when the

annual program is announced by NDHQ. This is always published in the routine orders of each establishment. The eligibility requirements and selection procedures are clearly detailed in CFAO 11-9. All the criteria outlined in the CFAO must be met or waived or a candidate's file will be returned by NDHQ.

3. A commissioning plan, often confused with the CFRP is the Special Requirements Commissioning Plan (SRCP). The purpose of this plan is to provide a means of commissioning officers of the Regular Force to meet the special and limited needs of the officer military occupations. The SRCP is applicable only to CWOs and outstanding MWOs falling into a four to seven year window to CRA at age 55. This plan further differs from the DFRP

in that, candidates commissioned under the SRCP will not receive any occupation training and will have only limited employment and advancement opportunities due to their short period of remaining service. CFAO 11-14 provides more details on this plan.

4. Those members of the Security Branch, who are nominated under CFRP, boarded and found to be suitable may not be commissioned into the Security Branch if the number suitable exceeds the quota. Whether or not there are vacancies i.e. the MOC is open or closed, is primarily dependent on two factors. First, each fiscal year, the Directorate Individual Training in consultation with other personnel directorates and the Security Classification Career Manager, determines what if any, will be the



officer production during each fiscal year for the Security Branch. officer production, simply stated, is the number of officers required to undergo classification training each fiscal year to meet forecasted shortfalls within the overall authorized strength of the classification. The factors taken into consideration to determine the production rate are; number of hard Sec 81 positions, secondments, language training, attrition, promotions and number of trained officers. If the classification is over strength or at status quo, it is possible to have a limited or nil intake of candidates in a given fiscal year.

5. Should this be the case, then those nominated under CFRP may not be commissioned into the Security classification. For the Sec 81 MOC, or any MOC, to be open for the CFRP, there must be at least one vacancy. The second factor is the

Long Range Planning Model (LRPM). The LRPM provides guidance as to what the make-up of the Security Officer occupation should be. Thus, out of the total authorized strength of the classification, each of the various commissioning plans will be a certain percentage. In developing the model each commissioning plan was weighed to determine how essential it was to the enhancement of the classification's operational effectiveness. The current percentages are as noted in the chart below:

Entry Plan	Total %
(a) CFRP	25
(b) UTPM	20
(c) ROTP	22
(d) DEO	23
(e) OCTP	10

6. As an example, should the classification be over the 25 percent level

for CFR's then the MOC will be closed to the CFRP. If however, the Branch has a shortfall and a suitable number of candidates from other entry plans are not available, then a higher percentage of CFRs may be then accepted into the classification. As with the first factor, none of this precludes the Commanding Officer from re-submitting a nominee in any subsequent years, if not accepted into the classification due to a lack of sufficient vacancies.

7. Thus to be commissioned under CFRP nominees must meet all the criteria of CFAO 11-9 and there must be a vacancy within the Security Officer classification for the CFR nominee. It must be stressed that the non-acceptance of a nominee in a particular year, does not preclude the Commanding Officer from re-submitting a nomination in subsequent years. Q.Q

BSOC 9101 - "Operation Red Cap Leader" or "How I Foolishly Thought I'd Never Have to Dig as an MP"

by: Lt. M. Zybala

It is 0530 hrs. Engines rumble and vehicles cut swaths of light through the morning mist as ILTIS are marshalled into position, ready for deployment. Elusive figures move between the jeeps, attending to last minute details. There is time for reflection and conversation in hushed tones, time for a last drag on a cigarette (the one token smoker). In the distance some poor plug is counting off push-ups for a moment's inattentiveness over his personal weapon.

Things are not going well. The Fantasian war machine stands poised on the border, rattling its sabres. It isn't war, yet, but a few are left in doubt as to the ultimate outcome. Doo Doo Happens, and 7 MP PL (also known as the Basic Security Officer Course 9101) will soon find itself in the middle of it.

A final briefing from the CO, delivered with phlegmatic aplomb by the School's British Exchange Officer, and the candidates of BSOC 9101 are launched on Exercise Sheriff's Roundup, the phase of the BSOC that will soon transform them into sleepwalking, incoherent, shivering husks of humanity. There are a thousand and one dangers to brave, problems to solve, trials and tribulations to be overcome.

The political situation, as expected, quickly degenerates into all-out war. The Fantasians are a wily and resourceful enemy, fielding the latest in unarmed reconnaissance/chemical warfare drones cleverly disguised as one of the Directing Staff's pet dog.

The enemy's recce patrols harass us day and night with hit-and-run attacks, prodding our defences, testing our resolve, inflicting "heavy" (particularly when directed to carry him

all the way to the Lisle Gate in a stretcher) casualties within our midst. But there is little time to mourn for the dead. There are routes to be



2Lt Jeff Hill guards his shellscrape against enemy attack. (Photo by A. H. Robar)



receded, a Command Post to be run, orders to be given, a brigade to be moved, a defensive position to be sited, and shell scrapes to be dug, and trenches to be dug, and a latrine to be dug, and an Observation Post to be dug, and a weapon's pit to be dug, with everything to be dug anew once the platoon is forced to crash out to a new location.

The week leads up to the final crescendo of doom when the enemy launches a concerted attack against our bivouac area. Supported by Fantasian armour, spurred onward by enemy pipers belting out the Fantasian rendition of "Scotland the Brave" (Fantasians are as ethnically confused as they are unprincipled and cruel), waves of enemy infantry crash

into the 7 MP PL defensive position. For an instant, the platoon teeters on the brink of destruction, escaping from the very jaws of perdition by crashing out at the high port, mauled and blooded to be sure, but remaining alive to fight yet another day.

Meanwhile, 7 MP PL's parent formation, 7 CMBG, reinforced by elements of 1 RCR and 8th Canadian Hussars, has counter-attacked, blasting the Fantasian menace back to the Stone Age. As dawn rises over the routing 2nd Fantasian army, 7 MP P1 receives the last desperate, suicidal charge of a handful of demoralized Fantasians determined not to suffer the fate promised them by their Political Officers at the hand of the enemy. All are cut down in a hail of Delefaat bullets.

Tired and sick, the surviving members of 7 MP P1 emerge from their trenches in stunned silence to survey the carnage and look, at long last, into the face of the enemy...

Submitted by Capt J.G. Savard on behalf of BSOC 9101, also known as hugs and kisses Q.O



BSOC students clean thier weapons after a long week in the field. (Photo by Lt. A. H. Robar)

Automation Update

by Capt C.E. Burley

MPS

The military Police System will automate the guardhouse and allow the MP to spend more time on the road rather than in the office doing clerical duties. It will allow the MP to access information on personnel and previous incidents more quickly and accurately than ever before and provide effective trend analysis. All MP Sections, Area HQs, Command HQs, and NDHQ will be linked via secure communication channels. The first location to be automated will be CFSIS which will then use the Military Police System to teach. I am unable at this time to determine when MPS will happen because of budget reviews, but I am hoping for the first installations to begin in 1994.

ISX

The contract for the first phase of the Intelligence and Security Complex, Security Workstations, was signed on 27 December 1990 with Digital Equipment Corporation. The contractor will deliver approximately 6 million dollars worth of computer equipment and software to NDHQ and SIU Sections and Detachments across Canada and Europe. A significant portion of the software development is for DSC. It will provide a system that will speed up the processing of security clearances and keep tack of the interim status of each clearance. The equipment, software, and training is to be delivered this fall/winter.

CPIC

CPIC terminals have been installed and are operational in DSC and D Police Ops.

CPIC for the bases will be some time in coming because the RCMP are not yet capable of accepting new users. Improvements to their computer system, currently underway, will allow us access. While it is not now technically possible to hook up to CPIC, we have been granted access, and we will take advantage of it as soon as technically feasible, possibly next year. Installation will depend on available funds, and the relative priority of this project in relation to other Security ADP projects.



DSC PSCQ Input

Chief Research and Development are currently working on a project to scan in and automatically verify PSCQ information. More than 220 checks are performed automatically, e.g., verifying that sons are not older than mothers and that all social insurance numbers are valid and consistent throughout the form. The scanners are quite slow now but the developers are confident that the scanner software can be improved and incorporated at the base level with the introduction of MPS. As soon as the systems are working more quickly they will be used at DSC to verify the PSCQs currently received.

LEIP and MPICF Data Bases

D Police Ops is currently working to develop the Law Enforcement Intelligence Program and Military Police Investigation Case File Data Base. When complete, these projects will provide D Police Ops with the capability of storing and retrieving the mounds of police and criminal intelligence information provided from all sources including military police reports from bases,

DIDB

The drug intelligence data base has been designed and is expected to be in operation with the delivery of new computers this fall/winter. This data base essentially provides the means to store drug information provided from many sources including urinalysis results, base MP sections, and outside sources. This will be a significant advancement in sorting through the many details involved in drug intelligence. When in operation, it will be a great asset to drug investigators when accessed through D Police Ops.

DSC/CSIS Interface

A computer interface has been developed with CSIS to allow CSIS checks to be conducted much more quickly. DSC now loads all applicable personnel information onto a floppy disk which is sent to CSIS for processing. Prior to this interface being developed, the PSCQ was sent to CSIS, where their operators extracted the required information and entered it manually into the computer, often months after its receipt. Q.Q

14 June 1991

* Capt Burley is currently employed in the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Automation at NDHQ. Her main functions are systems analysis of ADP requirements for the Security Branch, and drafting the necessary documentation for funding approval. She will be producing an update for each issue of the Thunderbird Journal to keep us apprised of current automation issues in Security Branch.



Capt. C.E. "Beth" Burley

FROM THE FIELD

CFSIS Annual Curling Bonspiel, 1991

by Lt. Bob Davies.

The crack of colliding rocks echoed off the ice as the combatants used all their skill to knock their opponents out of the house...

On 14-16 April 1991, the Canadian Forces School of Intelligence and Security held their annual curling bonspiel in the Circled Pines Golf and Curling Club, CFB Borden. Military Police curling teams from as far away as CFB Shearwater and as near as down the road (CFSIS had a number of teams in the tourney!) met to test their skill against their fellow MP's.

The level of skill of the players varied. Neophytes swept their ascots off to get that rock over the "hog-line", while seasoned veterans built their positions with pin-point accuracy. However, even the experts had to refresh their skills in the lost art of "Mountain Curling". Being late in the curling season, the ice was less than level and many a player cursed as he watched his rock make a 135 degree curl.

The event started with a "Meet and Greet" on Friday night, where players sized up the competition over a drink

or two. This was followed shortly by the first matches of the bonspiel. The school Commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel Don Johnson, opened the event by casting the first stone, so to speak. The games continued into the evening, and started again early the next morning. It takes a lot of skill to sweep with one hand and hold cup of black coffee in the other.

As the matches continued, the field thinned, eventually leading to the four division finals. When the ice chips had cleared there were four winning teams, three of which came



FROM THE FIELD

from the school. CFSIS almost "swept" the bonspiel with the team of Capt Findlater (Skip), Capt Savard, Sgt Faubert and MCpl Johnson the "A" event winners, with the "C" event going to the team of Maj Pilling (Skip), Capt Anderson, Capt Grubb, and MCpl Comeau. Completing the virtual CFSIS sweep, was the team of MWO MaQuarrie, WO Chiasson, WO Sheard and Sgt Grady. The only non-CFSIS winning team was the "B" Event winners, the CFB Kingston team of Capt Shaw (Skip), CWO Galigan, Sgt Bonany, Cpl Germain and Sgt Stuart of CFB London.

Once the victors were decided, the festivities began. An awards banquet was held Saturday night at the CFSIS Thunderbird Club. The food, prepared by the school gourmets, was excellent, and when the dining was completed, it was time to collect the prizes. The prize table was extensive, with \$3000 worth of donated items. There were more prizes than there were contestants. The most coveted items on the table were four portable Honda generators. The teams picked their prizes from the table order of first to fourth. When they had made their choice, the remainder of the teams went into a hat and were



CFSIS Commandant Lt Col D. Johnson casts the first stone.

(All photos by W.O. J.G. Chiasson.)

Lt Col Johnson (Far right) congratulates "A" event winners, CFSIS team of MCpl Johnson (Left), Capt Savard (Centre), and Capt Findlater (Right).



drawn, one by one, until everyone had a prize. The remainder were then given away at random. Everyone left with a smile on their face.

The organizers of this event deserve much credit for their hard work

in putting together a fine bonspiel. Although the attendance is not quite what it used to be, there was still a good turnout. It's always good to come home to play, and no one knows how to play like MP's. QOO

MEMORIES

Mystery Photo Contest

There have been no takers on identifying the mystery players from the 1963 C Pro C hockey team. In case you missed it in the last issue, the photo at right was sent in by Maj Terry Roberts and he asks you to identify the two players who still serve in the Canadian Forces. We will hold out with the answer and prize for one more issue.

Maj Roberts has retired from the CF since the printing of the last issue. He left in June of this year but his challenge still stands. QOO



In Memoriam

LCol (retd) Raymond Thériault

It is with deep sorrow that we announce the sudden death by heart attack of Lieutenant-Colonel Raymond (Ray) Thériault, CD at Ste-Foy, Québec, on Thursday 7 March 1991.

LCol Raymond Thériault was born and educated at L'Islet-Sur-Mer, P.Q., and enrolled in the RCAF in 1960 as a Communication Operator. He received his commission in 1967 and served as an Air Traffic Controller until reclassifying to the Security Branch.

As a Security Branch Officer, LCol Thériault held various appointments, including those of Base Security Officer, SIU Detachment Commander in Canada and Europe, Deputy Commanding Officer, SIU, and staff officer within the Directorate of Security,



Lieutenant-Colonel R. Thériault (Commanding Officer Special Investigation Unit 1984-1987)

NDHQ. He was also Director of Language Training, a Senior Staff appointment at NDHQ from 1982 to 1984. LCol Thériault was appointed Commanding Officer of the Special Investigation Unit in June 84 and relinquished Command on retirement from the Canadian Forces in July 1987.

LCol Thériault is mourned by his wife Denise and daughter Danielle, both of Québec, P.Q., daughter Carole of Vancouver B.C. and son François of Edmonton, Alberta.

Ray will always be remembered for his amiable manners, his sense of humour and joviality, and amongst all his total professional dedication to the Branch. He will be sorely missed by those who had the privilege of knowing him but no one will forget him. ☹☹

In Memoriam

Ernest K. Graves (retd)

It is with deep regret that we inform you of the departing of Ernest K. Graves (Retd). Mr. Graves was born on 28 January 1922 in Lachine, Québec. He enrolled in the Royal Canadian Air Force in 1939, where he served as

a member of the RCAF Police as a Corporal working with the Royal Air Force and RCAF during and after the Second World War. He served both in Canada and in Europe, where he was involved

with airfield security. Cpl Graves retired from the RCAF in 1947, being awarded the Canadian Volunteer Service Medal and the War Medal, 1939-45. He passed away on 25 April 1991 in Ottawa, Canada, at the age of 69. ☹☹



Letter from the editor

by maj Sandra Entwistle

In issue number 2, 1990, I alluded to the fact that we in NDHQ would have to find someone new to count down the months and days to retirement now that CWO Dan Nolan has moved on. Well, I found someone. Me! At this writing, I only have a few days left. It may seem hard for some to believe that I am actually "retiring" from the Service at my age, but that is in fact what I'm doing. I expect to be kept quite busy in my retirement, however, with a two-and-a-half year old and a new one due at the end of May 91!

I leave the Service and the Branch with mixed feelings, just like anyone else, for I have enjoyed the challenges presented me and I have enjoyed the people immensely (My gray hair is

proof!). But it is time to move on to a new life and new challenges - whatever they may be.

From a personal perspective, I wish to thank all of you with whom I worked, for it is you who made my career what it is (was). A special thank-you to all of "my" troops at CFB Kingston from May 85 to July 88 - I wish you all the best in your future endeavors and hope that if our paths should cross again some time, you'll stop to say hello.

From a Thunderbird Journal perspective, both Lt Lorna Fisher and I are moving on, so I would like to take this opportunity to say "thank-you" to all of you who took the time to write articles, anecdotes, letters, etc., for without your input, there wouldn't be a Journal. The "new" guard

is already chosen and they in fact will be putting out this issue. Cdr Macquarrie remains as your Editor-in-chief; your new managing Editor is Maj Wayne Boone and your new Assistant Managing Editor is Lt Bob Davies. I am confident that they are more than able to fill our shoes - they both have bigger feet than do Lorna and I!

Well, that about does it, except for warning those of you who are in CFS Masset - I'm coming your way this summer (as a spouse!). I'll leave it to you to do the investigative footwork to find out who my spouse is and what we'll be doing when we arrive! In the meantime, I've got to go and check my wardrobe to make sure I have enough wet weather gear to survive a couple years in Masset! ☺

Securitas, my friends.

